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Abstract
This thesis seeks to understand multinational activity in Indian industry after the reforms 
of 1991.
Chapter 2 models two effects of inward FDI on local industry - linkage and 
competition effects. We develop a two-sector model with vertical product differentiation 
in the downstream sector and a monopolistically competitive upstream sector. We show 
that a domestic content requirement increases both linkage and competition effects, and 
can raise domestic welfare through growth of upstream industry, and increased consumer 
welfare. The stronger are linkage effects, and lower the income level, the greater are 
benefits from a DCR.
Chapter 3 presents descriptive statistics and stylized facts about multinationals in 
India. We consider sectoral destination, characteristics, and performance o f MNCs. We 
find MNC investment is horizontal and that they are more profitable than domestic firms. 
A model o f distribution dynamics is used to investigate persistence in profitability. 
Differences in performance are driven by persistence o f profits o f highly profitable 
MNCs.
In Chapter 4 we test for the effects of FDI reforms on firm performance. By 
constructing treatment and control groups and using pre and post reform data, we isolate 
the impact o f reforms. We find that local firms' profitability has been reduced by the 
entry o f new MNCs. However, pre-existing MNC profits have not been significantly 
affected by reforms. We find some evidence that MNCs are more efficient than local 
firms.
In Chapter 5, we analyze export behaviour of Indian firms. Decomposing exports 
shows that post-reform export growth has been driven by surviving firms. We model the 
decision o f the firm to export, and find that there are substantial sunk costs to exporting. 
Firm characteristics - size, profitability and multinationality - are important determinants 
of exporting. We find evidence for spillovers from general exporting activity but not from 
MNC presence in the industry on exporting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In 1991, faced with a severe balance of payments crisis, India embarked on a historic set of 
reforms to free its economy from excessive state controls and bureaucratic regulations. Af­
ter four decades of inward-looking policies which led to increasing protectionism and import 
substitution, India began liberalising its economy with a set of policies having wide-ranging 
implications.1
One of the critical components of these reforms was the liberalization of foreign direct invest­
ment rules. In a major policy shift that broke decades of ambivalence, if not outright hostility 
towards multinationals, India allowed majority foreign ownership in its industry. Subsequently, 
there was a large increase in FDI flows, as annual inflows increased from $200 million in 1991 to 
$3.2 billion in 1997. This generated considerable debate in industry, policy, and media circles 
as to the appropriateness of allowing multinationals (MNC) into industry.2 The characteristics 
and impact of MNCs on Indian industry after liberalisation remains poorly understood and 
subject more to rhetoric than analysis. This thesis attempts to fill that lacuna by seeking to 
understand the nature of MNC activity in India, and it’s impact on domestic industry. In so 
doing, it aims not only to contribute to an understanding of multinationals in Indian industry, 
but also to develop analytical tools and draw lessons which could be applied to similar reforms
1 Consequently there was an improvement in almost all indicators of macroeconomic performance. See Acharya 
(2001) for a description of the macro reforms. For an interesting non-technical essay on the social and economic 
impact of the reforms, see Das (2000).
2 The main opposition party at the time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), used phrases such as ’silicon 
chips yes, potato chips no’ to signify its opposition to FDI in certain sectors, which then became buzzwords for 
the extensive debate on the issue in policy and media circles.
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and multinational investment in other developing countries.
The importance of analyzing the impact of MNC entry cannot be overstated. The issue 
attracts significant public attention and arouses strong passions in developing countries. There 
is a large theoretical and empirical literature looking at the effects of MNCs in developing 
countries.3 This thesis is an attempt to contribute to that literature by analysing a natural 
experiment of FDI entry, i.e., the FDI reforms in Indian industry starting from 1991.
This short introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next section puts the economic 
reforms into context by briefly describing the historical policy towards FDI followed by India. 
Details of the reforms starting from 1991 are left to be discussed in Chapter 4 below. To put 
the entry of MNCs into context, Section 3 discusses the theoretical literature for the evolution 
of MNCs. The next section describes the salient features of the thesis and the manner in which 
it is organized. Finally section 5 discusses the contributions of this thesis.
1.1 Indian Policy towards FDI
After independence in 1947, Indian economic policy attempted an industrial revolution through 
the agency of the state. This manifested itself in publicly owned, import substituting industri­
alization which was insulated from international competition. Domestic industry was accorded 
considerable protection in the form of high tariffs and quantitative restrictions on imports. In 
order to channel the country’s scarce investible resources according to priorities determined by 
the state, an industrial approval system was put into place in the country that regulated all 
industrial investments beyond a certain minimum.4
We can distinguish four broad periods in Indian policy towards FDI. The first period of 
1948-67 witnessed import protection and a generally ambivalent policy stance towards FDI. 
The second period of 1968-79 saw a hostile attitude to restrict the operations of MNCs. The 
third period of 1980-1991 was characterised by cautious deregulation and a gradual change from 
the hostile attitude of the previous decade. Finally, from 1991 onwards there was liberalisation, 
and relaxation of rules governing MNC entry.
3 See Caves (1996) for a comprehensive survey. Selected surveys of this literature are presented in the chapters 
below.
4See Bhagwati and Desai (1970). This section also draws upon Kumar (1990).
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In 1948 there was legislation introduced so as to regulate foreign capital in the ’national 
interest,’ and ensure that majority ownership and effective control remained in Indian hands. 
A new Industrial Policy Resolution of April 1956 was passed which earmarked a number of 
important industries for future exploration by the public sector, thus reducing the scope of 
operation of private - local and foreign firms. However, the foreign exchange crises of 1957- 
58, led to a liberalisation in the government’s attitude towards foreign capital. In a bid to 
attract foreign investment to finance the foreign exchange components of projects, a host of 
incentives and concessions were extended. Following this, in 1961, the government issued a 
list of industries where foreign investments were to be welcomed. These included industries 
earlier reserved for public sector - drugs, aluminium, heavy electrical equipment, fertilizers, 
synthetic rubber among others. The proportion of foreign held equity was to depend upon the 
sophistication of technology and requirement of foreign exchange. Local majority ownership, 
though welcome, was not to be insisted upon.
In 1968, following recommendations of the Mudaliar Committee on Foreign Collaborations 
(1966), a new agency called Foreign Investment Board (FIB) was created within the government 
to deal with all cases involving foreign investment or collaboration, except those in which total 
investment in share capital exceeded Rs. 20 million and where the proportion of foreign equity 
exceeded 40 percent. These latter cases were to be referred to the Cabinet Committee. In 
effect, this ruling restricted the level of foreign equity level to 40 percent. A new Patent Act 
was enacted in 1970 abolishing product patents in food, chemicals, and drugs, and reduced the 
life of process patents from 16 to 7 years. Foreign investment unaccompanied by technology was 
not favoured. Three illustrative lists of industries were issued which demarcated industries: a) 
where no foreign collaboration was considered necessary, b) where only technical collaboration 
could be permitted, and c) where foreign investment might be permitted.
The infamous, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), came into force in 1973 which 
required all foreign companies operating in India to register under Indian corporate legislation 
with upto 40 percent foreign equity.
The 1980s witnessed cautious deregulation. The industrial licensing rules were liberalised, 
and exemptions from foreign equity restrictions under FERA was granted to 100 percent export- 
oriented units. Rules and procedures concerning payments of royalties and lump-sum technical
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fees were relaxed and withholding taxes were reduced. The approvals for opening liaison offices 
by foreign companies in India were liberalised.
Finally, in June 1991, faced with a balance of payments crisis, the Indian government 
initiated a programme of macro-economic stabilization and structural adjustment supported by 
the IMF and World Bank. As part of this programme, a New Industrial Policy was announced 
which started the process of liberalisation, especially as it related to FDI.5
1.2 Theoretical Background on the M NC6
The multinational is defined in the theoretical literature as a firm which owns or controls 
income-generating assets in at least two countries (Dunning (1973)). The theory of the MNC 
is also a theory of FDI. The prevalent theory of the reasons for the existence of a MNC are 
built mainly on the contribution by Coase (1937), and the elaboration by Williamson (1975) of 
the transaction cost theory of the firm. According to this theory, there is a trade-off between 
the costs associated with transactions in the external market and the costs associated with 
transactions within the firm. The boundaries of the firm are chosen to find the best possible 
trade-off between these costs. The transaction cost approach to the theory of the MNC, also 
called internalization theory, stresses that the MNC is an institution created in order to reduce 
costs associated with international market transactions.
There are, however, other competing theories for the existence of the MNC. The early 
studies in the literature tended to emphasize barriers to entry in final product markets and 
the exploitation of monopolistic advantages by firms (Hymer (1960), Kindleberger (1969)). 
According to this view, the MNC arises to maximise monopoly power rather than in order to 
reduce transaction costs. Yet, this 10 approach and the transaction cost approach are very much 
related. For instance, they both tend to focus on market failures associated with arm’s length 
transactions in technological knowledge. Efficient pricing is not possible due to the public good 
nature of such assets, i.e., use of them in one location does not diminish the amount available in 
another location. Thus, if transacted in external markets, the assets would be underprovided.
5The details of the new policy are described in Chapter 4 below.
6This section  draws from Caves (1996) and Ekholm  (1995)
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Hymer (1960) suggested that a firm’s expansion abroad requires the possession of firm- 
specific advantages vis-a-vis local competitors. These advantages must outweigh the cost ad­
vantages that local firms are likely to have when operating in a familiar environment.
The 10 approach and the internalization theory tend to reach quite different conclusions 
about the social welfare aspects of MNCs. According to the 10 approach, the existence of MNCs 
can lead to increased degree of monopolization which results in social losses. The transaction 
cost approach, on the other hand, focuses on the MNC as an instrument for reducing transaction 
costs, thereby enhancing efficiency in the global economy.
Another strand in the literature that falls within the 10 approach is analyses based on 
oligopolistic rivalry. Later versions of the product cycle model (Vernon 1971-74) belong to this 
tradition, as do studies by Knickerbocker (1973), Graham (1978, 1991), and Cantwell (1989). 
These approaches focus on the strategic interaction between firms in oligopolistic markets. 
This type of analysis generally implies that growth of foreign production by MNCs tends to 
be associated with an increased level of competition. This is one important difference between 
the analyses based on oligopolistic rivalry and most of the work in the Hymer-Kindleberger 
tradition, since the latter generally holds that the expansion of the MNC leads to a lower level 
of competition.
The OLI theory associated with Dunning, constitutes an attempt to synthesize elements 
from the 10 approach and the internalization theory. The theoretical framework identifies 
three important factors influencing the firm’s choice between different modes of supplying a 
certain market. First, the firm’s possession of ownership advantages determines whether it 
has a competitive advantage relative to its competitors. This factor includes the firm-specific 
advantages stressed by the 10 approach. Second, the foreign country’s location advantages de­
termine whether production of a certain good is more profitable abroad than at home. Location 
advantages are determined by comparative advantages and by barriers to trade, such as tariffs 
and transport costs. Third, internalization advantages determine whether a given ownership 
advantage will be exploited abroad through the establishment of a foreign subsidiary, through 
exports, or through some other arrangement, such as technology licensing. These advantages 
depend on the level of the transaction costs associated with different modes of supplying the 
foreign market.
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Trade theorists have modeled some of the insights gained from the OLI framework. Two 
different approaches to the location of MNC production can be identified: the factor proportion 
approach and the proximity concentration approach. According to the factor proportion ap­
proach, the firm’s decision to locate production abroad is driven by the desire to take advantage 
of cheaper factors of production. (Markusen 1984, Helpman & Krugman 1985, Helpman 1984). 
In these models, a firm will choose to locate production abroad when differences in factor pro­
portions become sufficiently large, and the affiliates will serve consumers in the home country 
by re-exporting.
According to the proximity-concentration approach, on the other hand, there is a trade-off 
between the advantages of being located close to the customers and those of concentrating 
production in the home country. (Krugman 1983; Horstmann & Markusen 1992; Brainard 
1993). Multinational production arises when proximity advantages dominate, which are likely 
to do when trade is costly and scale economies at corporate level are much greater than those at 
plant level. Whether transaction cost factors or factors related to market structures are more 
relevant when explaining the existence of actual MNCs is essentially an empirical issue.
1.3 Description of Thesis
This section provides a brief description of the rest of the thesis.
Chapter 2 models the impact of inward Foreign Direct Investment on local industry. Inward 
FDI in a developing country has essentially two important effects on local industry - a linkage 
effect on local suppliers, and a competition effect on local producers competing in the same 
industry. We develop a two sector model with the downstream sector containing vertically 
differentiated local and multinational firms competing in prices. The upstream sector has 
many firms and is modeled as monopolistically competitive of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier type. 
An increased demand for inputs by downstream firms causes the upstream sector to expand as 
more firms enter the industry, and the price of inputs to fall. The chapter analyses the impact 
of a common policy tool - a domestic content requirement (DCR) - which stipulates the fraction 
of inputs that must be sourced locally by a multinational firm. We show that a DCR increases 
both linkage and competition effects, and can raise domestic welfare primarily through growth
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of the upstream industry, and increased consumer welfare. The stronger are linkage effects, and 
the lower the income level, the greater are the benefits from a DCR. Thus, this chapter shows 
that the use of domestic content requirements can generate pecuniary externalities, which can 
increase benefits from FDI for a low-income developing country.
Chapter 3 presents descriptive statistics and stylized facts about MNCs in India. It de­
scribes the firm level panel data set we use for the empirical section of the thesis. First, we 
consider the sectoral destination of FDI approvals in Indian industry. We classify inward FDI 
qualitatively according to criteria related to technology, wages, orientation, market structure, 
and skills. Second, we investigate the characteristics of MNCs versus local firms in terms of 
size, export and import intensity, average costs of production, wages, spending on R&D and 
Advertising. Third, we analyze the performance of MNCs relative to local firms as measured 
by profitability. We consider aggregate returns on assets and profit margins, and then decom­
pose changes in profitability to changes due to entering firms, exiters, or survivors. We then 
investigate persistence in profitability by employing a model of distribution dynamics, and us­
ing transition matrices and mobility indices. This allows us to compare the dynamics of profits 
between MNCs and local firms, as well as between high and low performers within these groups. 
We consider both absolute as well as relative persistence of profits to understand which firms 
are driving the differences in performance.
In Chapter 4 we formally test for the effects of FDI reforms on firm profitability. By 
constructing treatment and control groups for reformed and not reformed industries and by 
comparing data on these groups before and after reforms, we are able to control for all other 
factors affecting firm profitability. Employing a difference-in-difference estimation strategy to 
isolate the impact of reforms on profits, we test whether differences in profitability between 
local firms and MNCs can be explained by barriers to mobility or due to efficiency differences 
between the two groups of firms.
In Chapter 5, we analyze the export behaviour of Indian firms in the post-reform period. 
Given that there has been a significant rise in export intensity in manufacturing after the 
reforms, we decompose export growth into contributions due to surviving firms, new entrants, 
and exiters to understand the source of this growth. We model the decision of the firm to 
export, and estimate a dynamic binary choice model with unobserved heterogeneity. Following
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the literature we use and compare different estimation strategies with probability of exporting 
as our dependent variable. Using firm level data on exports, we test whether there is evidence 
of sunk costs to exporting in Indian industry. We also test whether firm characteristics, most 
notably performance, is an indicator of exporting status. There is some debate in the literature 
on the direction of causality between export behaviour and firm performance. Here, we test 
whether more successful firms tend to export more. A key area of debate in the literature on 
multinationals is whether the presence of MNCs in the same industry encourages domestic firms 
to export more. We test whether there are any industry level spillovers from MNCs to local 
firms. Finally, we investigate evidence for spillovers from general exporting activity in the same 
industry.
1.4 R esults & Contributions
The primary motivation for this thesis was to understand the nature of multinational activity 
in Indian industry after the reforms of 1991. We use theoretical and empirical methods to con­
tribute to furthering that understanding. The theoretical section models product differentiation 
between the local and multinational firm and combines this with monopolistic competition in 
the upstream industry to provide a framework to model two primary effects on industry, a 
linkage effect and a competition effect. The framework is then used to analyse the effects of 
a domestic content requirement. The results show that a DCR can raise domestic welfare pri­
marily through growth of the upstream industry, and increased consumer welfare. The stronger 
are linkage effects, and the lower the income level, the greater are the benefits from a DCR. 
This framework can be extended in several directions to address issues such as quality upgra- 
dation by local firms. The simulations remain at a preliminary stage and can be developed 
to provide deeper insights into issues such as costs of quality upgrading, efficiency differences 
between firms, and taste for quality in the population, and its impacts on the main effects of 
the model. Further, the model can be tested empirically for the importance of linkage and 
competition effects. Hence the framework can be usefully applied to address similar issues for 
other developing countries.
The empirical section of the thesis uses an Indian firm level panel data set to understand
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multinational and local activity after the economic reforms. The descriptive statistics on the 
sectoral destination, characteristics and performance of firms after reforms provides a panoramic 
view of multinationals and local firms. We use distribution dynamics techniques from the growth 
literature to analyse the evolution of profits across the profit space among multinationals and 
local firms which enables us to understand issues of persistence and mobility, as well as to isolate 
groups of firms which are driving differences in performance. We find that foreign investors 
in India have favoured medium technology, high-wage, specialised supplier, scale intensive, 
differentiated goods, and skilled labour industries. We find some evidence that FDI in Indian 
has been of the horizontal type. Comparing the characteristics of MNCs versus local firms 
we find that they are larger in size, have similar export and import intensities as local firm, 
have lower average costs of production and pay higher wages, and spend more on R&D and 
Advertising. Comparing the performance of the two ownership groups reveals that on aggregate 
MNCs have consistently outperformed local firms over the sample period. The decomposition 
of profits shows us that changes in overall profits for local as well as MNCs are being driven 
by changes in average profitability for surviving firms. Even though the period has seen a 
lot of entry, the new firms are not having a large impact on aggregate profits. Analysis of 
the distribution dynamics of profits reveals that there is a lot of persistence in performance. 
Persistence is particularly strong in the top and bottom deciles, i.e., the highest and poorest 
performers tend to stay that way. The differences in aggregate profits between MNCs and local 
firms seem to be driven by the top performing MNCs earning persistently higher profits than 
the top performing local firms.
We then test for the impact of reforms on domestic and MNC firm performance. Our dataset 
allows us to treat the reforms of 1991 as a natural experiment for the entry of multinationals 
as we are able to distinguish between industries and years which were subject to reform, and 
those that were not. We find that local firms’ profitability has been reduced by the competitive 
pressure applied by MNCs. However, pre-existing MNC profits have not been significantly 
affected by reforms. We find some evidence that MNCs are more efficient than local firms. 
Such a dataset and the differences-in-differences technique could be used to shed light on other 
variables of interest such as productivity, market structure, investment behaviour, and industry 
growth amongst others. Further work could also focus on testing the determinants of firm
15
performance in Indian industry.
Finally, we investigate export behaviour of Indian firms. We use a model and data which 
allows us to test for sunk costs in exporting, firm characteristics, and spillovers from MNCs 
as well as general exporting activity. This contributes to the literature by enhancing our 
understanding of firm export behaviour in India. We find that there are sunk costs to exporting 
in Indian industry, and that firm characteristics, most notably performance, are an important 
determinant of exporting activity. We find evidence of spillovers from general exporting activity 
but not from the presence of MNCs in the industry. These methods could also be usefully applied 
to answer similar questions for other developing country exporting behaviour. More research 
would be required to understand the determinants of the export intensity increase in India, 
and the contribution of trade reforms towards that purpose. Further work could also focus on 
understanding geographical spillovers from multinationals.
On the whole, we hope that this thesis makes a modest contribution to our understanding 
of multinational activity in India after the reforms of 1991, and also offers some ideas for future 
work.
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Chapter 2
FD I, Linkages and Local Content 
Requirem ents
2.1 Introduction
The large increase in multinational activity in developing countries in recent times, has also led 
to a renewed interest among researchers in modeling the effects on the recipient host country. 
The primary impact of inward FDI seems to be on the host country industry. In this chapter, 
we focus on two important effects of multinational (MNC) investment, namely linkages and 
competition effects.
When an MNC produces in a host country, it typically purchases some local inputs. The 
consequent increase in demand for local inputs facilitates the growth of the upstream supplier 
industry through backward linkage effects. The development of the upstream industry then 
leads to forward linkage effects as the cheaper and/or better quality inputs produced by the 
upstream firms are now available to the downstream local industry, which in turn expands.1 
These effects can be extremely large, and lead to the development of entire industries. There is 
case study evidence from East Asia that multinational investment led to phenomenal growth of 
the intermediate as well as the final goods industry.2 Particularly striking is the development 
of the semi-conductor industry in Singapore, the sewing machine industry in Taiwan, and
1See Markusen & Venables (1999) for a recent documentation of linkage effects and cumulative causation.
2 See Hobday (1995)
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the electronics components industry in Malaysia. Given the importance of FDI in generating 
linkages, and the externalities inherent in them, there appears to be a potential role for welfare 
improving government policy.3
There is, however, another important effect of MNCs on host industry - a competitive 
pressure on local firms in the same industry. There is theoretical and empirical backing for 
the hypothesis that an increasing number of multinationals locate in developing countries to 
produce near end-consumers, rather than to take advantage of cheap factor costs.4 We take this 
line of research as the starting point of our analysis. Once multinational production is aimed 
to serve the local market, rather than for exports, then competition with local firms becomes 
a critical consideration in the evaluation of host country welfare. Thus, apart from linkages 
generated, the competition effects of multinational activity become central to our analysis.
One policy tool which has been used by host governments to regulate multinationals is a 
Domestic Content Requirement (DCR), which essentially stipulates the minimum fraction of 
inputs that must be sourced from the host country by the multinational. Content requirements 
have been used in developing as well as industrialised countries typically targeting multinational 
downstream producers in oligopolistic industries. The objective is not only to increase output 
of domestic intermediates, but also to create a ’level playing field’ for domestic downstream 
firms by forcing similar procurement conditions onto foreign firms. Examples of DCRs include 
restrictions on Japanese manufacturers in the EU (of products such as computer printers, copiers 
and video tape recorders) to source at least 40% of components from the EU. DCRs are even 
more extant in developing countries.5 India requires multinational producers of passenger cars 
to use no more than 50 percent imported content by the third year of production, and no more 
than 30 percent imported content by the end of the fifth year.
Given the widespread use of content requirements, there has been little research devoted to 
analysing its effects on the host economy. Since Grossman (1981), a small theoretical literature 
has developed. Most of the early papers argue against content requirements on the grounds
3Rodriguez-Clare (1996), for example, has shown that backward and forward linkages are increasing with the 
amount of inputs sourced locally by multinationals.
4 See Brainard (1997) for an exposition of the proximity-concentration hypothesis versus the factor-proportions 
hypothesis.
5 See UNIDO (1986) for a description of the prevalence and extent of content requirements in developing 
countries.
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that it has distortionary and anti-competitive effects on the host industry. The intermediate 
goods sector is usually modeled as a monopoly or an oligopoly.6 This paper concentrates on 
an effect of a DCR which has hitherto been ignored by the literature, namely linkage effects. 
We will show that a content requirement, by increasing linkage effects can actually increase 
domestic welfare.
This chapter has two objectives. First, we develop a framework to analyse the effects of 
multinationals on developing country industry, especially the linkage and competition effects 
mentioned earlier. Second, we use this framework to understand the impact of a domestic 
content requirement on host economy welfare.
2.1.1 Main Ideas
Multinationals in developing countries are often distinguished by the superior quality of their 
products in comparison to local goods. The better quality normally comes from the MNC’s 
world-wide access to sophisticated inputs, higher skilled workers, more R&D and so on. For 
example, the automobile multinational, General Motors, uses hundreds of international sup­
pliers at globally competitive prices to meet its input requirements. GM demands not only 
electrical, chemical, and metallic inputs from its suppliers but also logistics, systems control, 
process development, and so on. By its very nature, and because it has access to high quality 
inputs abroad, a MNC normally tends to use a smaller fraction of domestic inputs per unit 
output than the local firm. When a content requirement is imposed, the multinational, in order 
to continue producing in the host economy, is compelled to source a larger fraction of its inputs 
domestically. Given that the local input industry in the host country is underdeveloped, greater 
usage of low-quality local inputs by the multinational means that it has to compromise on the 
quality of its final product. In effect, a domestic content requirement leads to quality down­
grading by the multinational.7 Quality downgrading by the multinational mainly affects three 
groups in the host economy: i) the local producers who are competing with the multinational
6See papers by Beghin & Summer (1992) and Krishna &; Itoh (1988). This assumption on upstream market 
structure seems to be invalid. In industries where DCRs are commonly imposed, eg. automobile and capital 
goods industry, there are many local component suppliers.
7 Over time, the quality of the local inputs may improve. This is another channel through which the linkage 
effect would work, and strengthens its case. See Matouschek (2000) on the above. The following analysis holds 
as long as there is some global supplier whose quality is superior than that of the local ones.
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in product markets, ii) the upstream industry supplying the inputs, iii) the domestic consumers 
of the final good.
As the DCR fosters similar procurement policies for local and multinational firms, the 
MNC’s product becomes relatively less differentiated in quality to the local firm, than before. 
Now the MNC provides more intense price and quality competition to the local firm. Second, 
the content requirement by forcing the MNC to source more inputs locally leads to greater 
backward linkages, hence development of the upstream industry. Third, consumers get a lower 
quality, but the intensification of competition leads to a lowering of prices. A further downward 
pressure on prices comes from the positive forward linkage: the development of the upstream 
industry leads to lower prices of inputs and thus to lower product prices. There is clearly a 
tension between these effects. In other words, a lower quality multinational leads to greater 
linkage effects, but also to greater competition effects. So, for host economy welfare, these 
opposing forces have to be taken on board to adequately appraise the effects of local content 
requirements.
We show that under loose assumptions on taste for quality and thereby income distribution 
among consumers, a DCR improves consumer welfare. We also show conditions under which 
even the local firms competing in the same industry as the MNC are better off - namely, when 
positive forward linkage effects dominate competition effects.
This chapter contributes to the literature on inward FDI in several ways. First, it incorpo­
rates quality differences in production of downstream goods in a two sector model to adequately 
capture the salient features of MNC investment. Second, it analyzes the effects of a common 
policy tool on FDI - domestic content requirements, and shows that it can be welfare improving 
for the host economy. Third, it models the effect of FDI on consumer welfare in the context of 
a two-sector model.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model for the 
analysis. Section 3 analyses the effects of domestic content requirements. Section 4 discusses 
the implications and applicability of the foregoing analysis. Section 5 concludes.
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2.2 The M odel
To model the effects mentioned above, we clearly need two sectors in the local economy - an 
upstream and a downstream sector. We also need a framework which differentiates quality 
between the local and the multinational good. Further, there must be strategic interaction 
between the local and multinational firms to capture competition effects. To capture linkage 
effects, we need dynamic interaction between downstream demand for inputs and upstream 
production. Here, we model the various effects by combining two different frameworks - the 
vertical product differentiation framework of Shaked & Sutton (1982), and the monopolistic 
competition framework of Dixit & Stiglitz (1977). With the help of this framework, we can 
also model consumer welfare. The critical dynamic link between the upstream and downstream 
sectors is that as downstream demand for inputs increases, more firms enter the upstream 
industry, which in turn reduces the input price index.8 To focus on the effects of multinationals 
on the host country, we restrict our analysis to the local economy. This economy has two sectors 
- an upstream sector, and a downstream sector.
2.2.1 Downstream  Industry
Following Brainard (1993), the multinational locates in the host economy to be close to final 
consumers. We focus on domestic sales of multinationals and do not consider multinational 
exports in the analysis. Multinational entry only occurs in the final-goods industry.
To capture the effects outlined in Section 1 above, we let the downstream sector consist of 
two firms, a local firm and a multinational. These two firms provide a single product which 
differs in quality. So, we have vertical product differentiation in this sector. The modeling of 
this sector follows Tirole (1988).
8 This framework is largely based on Markusen & Venables (1999). One criticism of the approach is the lack of 
strategic interaction between upstream firms. For our purposes, the focus is on downstream competition effects 
where we have strategic interaction.
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Demand:
Consumers either consume one unit of the good or none. If they consume the good, their 
preferences are given by:
U =  9 s - p  (2.1)
where
s : quality of the good
p: price of the good
0 is taste for quality and is uniformly distributed across the population of consumers between
where 6 >  0 and 6 =  9 + 1
The parameter 9 can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income 
and quality. High income consumers are willing to give up more income to consume a higher 
quality good, than low income consumers. Hence the taste for quality distribution can be 
simultaneously viewed as an income distribution.
Firm i produces a good of quality Si
Throughout the following analysis we let the domestic firm be i =  1, and the multinational 
i =  2
We assume that:
9 > 2 9
This assumption says that the amount of consumer heterogeneity is sufficient for what 
follows.
Let the 9 where the consumer is indifferent between goods 1, 2 be 9
Hence for the marginal consumer:
9si -  p i =  9s2 -  P2 (2 .2)
Therefore,
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q =  P 2 - P i 
S2 ~  Si
(2.3)
Letting A s =  s2 — s i,
The demand for goods 1 and 2 is thus given by:
Di(pi-P2) =  ?~ 1 -S . (2.4)
and
Z>2 (p1;P2) = 5 - ^ ^ -  (2.5)
Supply:
Let unit marginal costs of production for downstream firms be given by:
ci =  b\ [(1 -  i4 )r  +  /if?] (2.6)
and
C2 =  b2 [(1 -  i4 ) r  +  p U  (2-7)
where:
/if  : Firm i’s demand for domestically produced input as a fraction of total input require­
ment;
r: Price index for foreign input, which is exogenously given; 
q\ Price index for domestic input, which is endogenous,
1 — /if: Firm i’s demand for foreign inputs as a fraction of total input requirement
bi : Efficiency parameter - a lower b implies greater efficiency - ceteris paribus.
We assume that the foreign price index is greater than the domestic price index: r >  q
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This assumption seems reasonable due to the vertical product differentiation set-up. Since 
the inputs manufactured domestically are of lower quality, they must be cheaper than the 
foreign inputs. If this was not the case, i.e., the domestic input was of lower quality and more 
expensive, firms will avoid using any local inputs.
Now,
Mjf fo r  je  1,2
is the input-output co-efficient, i.e., the input of the local upstream industry required per 
unit total input requirement of the downstream industry.
To focus on the key variables, and to keep the system tractable, we use a simple linear 
relation between quality and inputs. Hence ’quality’ technology is given by:
Si =  1 +  a (l -  /if)
Thus, a larger fraction of the high quality foreign input in total inputs, improves quality.
Now, we are only concerned about the relative quality of the two goods rather than an 
absolute measure. Hence we make the simplifying assumption that the local firm only uses 
domestic inputs and has no access to foreign inputs:9 /if =  1
Hence, the local firms quality, si =  1,
So the difference in quality between the multinational and local good is related to inputs
via:
As =  a (l -  /if) (2.8)
where: 0 < a <  1
Here, a signifies the cost of quality upgrading. The higher is a, the lower proportion of 
foreign inputs axe needed to produce a good of a given quality. Since foreign inputs are more
9The specification of the cost function is general enough to allow for the domestic firm to use foreign inputs. 
All the subsequent analysis and results are similar as long as the fraction of foreign inputs used by local firms is 
smaller than that used by multinationals.
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expensive than local ones, a higher a implies lower costs of quality upgrading.
The ’quality’ technology is such that it is only the foreign input that leads to differences in 
quality. A larger fraction of inputs sourced globally rather than within the developing country 
leads to a higher quality output. Since the multinational uses high-quality inputs from abroad, 
it produces a good of better quality than the local firm:
s2 > si
Now, the local and multinational firm’s optimisation problem is10
M axpi 7Ti =  (pi -  ci)D i (pi;p2) (2.9)
and
M axp2 7t2 =  (p2 -  c2) D 2 {pi ,P2 ) ~  G (2.10)
where
G : fixed cost for the multinational
The fixed cost for the multinational arises from the initial set-up costs of producing in the 
host country.
Finally, the total demand for inputs arises from adding the local and multinational’s indi­
vidual demand for domestic inputs
I =  Dlblni +  D2b2^  (2.11)
We make the following additional assumption:
| c i  +  i c 2 +  i  (O -  20) As < Osi (2.12)
10Following Lahiri & Ono (1998), we assume that for the multinational, the alternative to producing in the
host economy is to produce in another country. Without loss of generality, suppose the reservation profit for the
MNC is 7? =  0.
For the following analysis, we assume that 7T2 >  0
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This ensures that in price equilibrium, the market is ’covered’, i.e., each consumer buys one 
of the two goods.11
2.2.2 Upstream Industry
The industry is imperfectly competitive and has many potential firms. Each firm is able to 
differentiate its product so that the output of the firms are imperfect substitutes. The industry 
is modeled as monopolistically competitive of the Dixit-Stiglitz-Ethier kind, with free entry. 
The main mechanism is the following - changes in demand change profits and the number of 
firms operating in the industry. This change in production changes the price of goods supplied 
(forward linkage) which feed back - and there is cumulative causation.
Demand
We construct a price index for intermediate goods defined over the varieties of products pro­
duced by different firms and taking the form:
= [n z]-'Y -' (2.13)
where
q: price index
n: number of firms in the industry
Z{: price of an individual upstream firm’s product
7 : measure of product differentiation in the industry. A low 7  represents a high degree of 
product differentiation.
Assume 7  >  1
Hence, the price index is decreasing in the number of firms in the industry.
Demand for a single variety:12
11 The assumption ensures that the price of the lower quality good in equilibrium (LHS), is less than or equal 
to the willingness to pay for that good. See Tirole (1988) and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
12 By interpreting the price index as an expenditure function and then using Shephard’s Lemma.
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Xi =  z i 7 I q y (2 .14)
where
I  : Total Intermediate demand 
From the above two equations, we have:
nz{Xi =  q l
Supply
Profits for each firm in the industry is given by:
7Ti =  ZiXi -  Pi (Xi +  Fi) (2.15)
where
PiFi : Fixed cost for each firm 
Pi: Marginal cost of production
2.2.3 Equilibrium
For equilibrium, we use game theoretic solutions for the following sequence of events:
1) The multinational chooses the amount per unit output of the local input (ftf). Effectively, 
this is a quality choice.
2) The upstream firms choose quantity to maximise profits, by taking into account the total 
demand for the input derived from the game the downstream firms will be playing.
3) The downstream firms compete in prices.
We solve the game backwards, using sub-game perfection.
Downstream industry
Given marginal costs of production (2.6) and (2.7), and demand for goods 1 and 2, (2.4) and 
(2.5), the MNC and local firm compete in prices.
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Profit maximisation gives: 
For firm 1:
M axPl 7Ti =  (pi -  ci) D i (pi;p2)
FOC:
p2 =  OAs — ci +  2pi (2.16)
where As is given by eqn (2.8); 
and for firm 2:
M ax^ 7T2 =  {p2 -  c2) D2 (pi;P2 )
FOC:
P2 =  (pi +  c2 +  9A s)/2  (2.17)
Upstream Industry
Firms in the industry are small, hence they take the price index as given. They choose quantity
to maximise profits. Taking the first order condition of eqn (2.15) yields:
H ( l  -  1 )  =  A (2.18)
Since we have monopolistic competition, profits for each firm are driven to 0 
Hence 7r =  0 condition gives:
Xi =  (7 - l ) F i  (2.19)
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Input Choice
Using the solutions to stages 3 and 2 above, we solve for stage 1. The MNC chooses the 
amount of local input per unit output taking into account the fact that this will affect both 
quality of his good as well as total intermediate input demand. The change in intermediate 
demand would have an effect on the upstream price index (q), which would in turn impact on 
the marginal costs of production for downstream firms as well as the final price of the good. 
Finally, consumer demand for both goods will also be affected by the input choice of the MNC, 
as the latter affects both price as well as quality of the final goods.
Hence, profit maximisation for the MNC gives:
Max^d 7T2 =  (P2 -  C2)D2 (pi;P2) ~  G
FOC:
S  = ^ - S )Z,2 + (K-C2)S  = 0 ( 2 ' 2 0 )
The first term on the RHS in eqn (2.20) above shows the effect of input choice on price of 
final good and costs. Marginal costs are given by eqn (2.6) and (2.7) while the effect on price 
is seen by taking the partial derivatives with respect to input choice by using eqn (2.16) and 
(2.17). Finally, the second term on the RHS shows the effect of input choice on demand for the 
MNC good, where demand is given by eqn (2.5).
Combining the equations for the 3 stages gives us equilibrium.13
In equilibrium:
^2 =  ^2
Pi =  |ci(jxg) +  ^C2(l4) +  ^ (0 -  20) A s(t4 )  (2.21)
13 See Appendix for details
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P2 =  |c i ( /^ )  +  | c 2(/if) +  |  {26 -  0) A s{i4 )  (2.22)
Both firms make more profits when they are more differentiated, firm 1 gains from reducing 
its quality and firm 2 from increasing its quality. Hence firms try to relax price competition 
through product differentiation.14
2.3 D om estic Content Requirem ent
Suppose the host government stipulates the minimum fraction of inputs that must be sourced 
locally by the multinational. To have any impact, the stipulated fraction must be larger than 
the amount the multinational would otherwise choose in equilibrium 
Let H2 be the domestic content requirement 
This implies:
t 4 > ^ 2
If the multinational continues to produce in the host economy, the new input-output co­
efficient fi\ of the multinational must not be less than be greater than 
Now, the relation between quality difference and inputs is given by:
As = a(l — ^ 2)
The crucial assumption we make is that:
b2l4 <  h l 4  (2.23)
The amount of locally produced inputs used by the multinational per unit output, is less 
than that used by local firms. This may be due to the MNC being more efficient (62 <  &i)
14See Shaked & Sutton (1982), and particularly, Tirole (1988) for details. Note that if the quality of domestic 
firm is fairly low, it could end up facing no demand. This would prevent maximal differentiation. However, the 
assumption in eqn (2.12) avoids this scenario.
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and/or because multinationals source their inputs differently (jlf <  /if)  
Linkage Effect: In equilibrium, we have:15
>  0 (2.24)
dAs
Quality downgrading by the MNC means that it is substituting away from higher quality 
foreign inputs into lower quality local inputs. Thus, the demand for local inputs is rising, which 
increases the number of firms in the upstream industry and decreases the upstream price index. 
Thus, eqn (2.24) above captures the backward and forward linkage effects.
With a content requirement, we now have the following three-stage game:
1) The multinational firm chooses the amount per unit output of its local input, given the 
content regulations.
2) The upstream firms take into account the input demands of downstream firms, and choose 
quantity to maximise profits.
3) The downstream firms compete in prices.
We solve the game using sub-game perfection.
Stage 3) and 2) above are the same as analyzed in section 2. Using the solutions to those 
stages, we can solve for stage 1, taking output prices, and the upstream price index as given:
P roposition  1: The multinational uses exactly the stipulated level of domestic contents, 
i.e., /if =  if:
i) The multinational continues to make non-negative profits in the host economy.
ii) It’s profits are monotonically declining with domestic content requirements.
iii) There is sufficient consumer heterogeneity for both firms to exist with DCR.
Proof.
See Appendix
Essentially, this proposition says that if the profits of the multinational are falling with 
quality downgrading (due to the domestic content requirement), then it will not choose to 
downgrade quality any more than is essential. Hence, it will not use local inputs more than 
the required amount. Clearly, it can’t choose inputs below /if. Thus, in equilibrium, the multi­
15 See appendix for details
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national will set p,* =  P2 • Condition ii) above states that the multinational must continue to 
make non-negative profits. If the domestic content requirement is such that the multinational 
makes negative profits, then it will obviously cease production. In all of the above analysis we 
are assuming without loss of generality that the outside option of the MNC is W =  0
2.3.1 Price of Local Good
When a domestic content requirement is imposed, the multinational has to source more inputs 
locally. This leads to an increase in the demand for local inputs, which encourages entry into 
the monopolistically competitive upstream sector. The entry of new firms lowers the upstream 
price index q. The decrease in q reduces costs of both the local and multinational firm. However, 
the costs of the local firm fall by more as it uses more domestic inputs than its rival. This is 
the linkage effect.
The content requirement also leads to a second effect: a competition effect. As was pointed 
out earlier, the firms relax price competition through product differentiation. After a content 
requirement, however, the quality of the multinational good decreases. Further, the price of the 
multinational good will also fall. This is due to two reasons - (a) as the multinational substitutes 
cheaper local inputs for foreign inputs, his costs fall (r >  q). (b) The increased demand for local 
inputs causes greater linkage effects making q fall. Hence the price of the multinational good 
falls. We now want to understand what happens to the price of the local good. Now, there 
is greater quality and price competition for the local firm. Both the competition and linkage 
effects should tend to reduce price of the local good. The price can only rise if perversely the 
content requirement leads to anti-competitive effects which are so great as to swamp the linkage 
effects.16 Below we derive sufficient conditions under which price of the local good decreases 
with content requirements.
Lem m a 1 A sufficient condition for the price of the local good to decrease with content require­
ments is (0 — 20) >  0 , i.e., sufficiently heterogenous taste for quality among consumers so that 
both goods are purchased.
16In this case, the profits of the local firm will unambiguously increase. However, for the remainder of the 
paper we concentrate on the more interesting case when local prices fall.
35
Proof. See Appendix
Hence, for the price of the local good to decrease, the taste for quality spectrum, or al­
ternately, the income distribution should be sufficiently heterogenous so that both goods are 
purchased after the content requirement, i.e., (9 — 29) >  0.
2.3.2 Relative Price:
We have established above that with a content requirement, the price of the multinational good 
falls. We have also established conditions under which the price of the local good falls. What 
about the relative price? We would expect the multinational’s price to decrease more because 
it is downgrading its quality and switching to cheaper inputs.
Lem m a 2 The price difference between the two firms ’ products is decreasing with a domestic 
content requirement.
Proof. See appendix.
As a domestic content requirement is imposed, the multinational is forced to downgrade 
quality. If the taste for quality is low in the population, and linkages very strong, then the 
domestic firm can lower its price by more than its multinational rival.
2.3.3 Demand for Local Good:
We would expect demand for the local good to fall with a DCR due to increased competition. 
Here we derive conditions under which demand for the local good actually increases.
Lem m a 3 A domestic content requirement leads to an increase in demand for the local good,
if
a) Lemma 2 above holds, i.e., the price difference between the two firms decreases.
b) The decrease in the price difference between the two goods is less than the willingness to 
pay for quality of the marginal consumer, =  9
Proof.
dD\ _  dk /dA s k ^   ^ ~
dKs =  A s (As)2 dAs <  A s =
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The demand for the local good is increasing with quality downgrading by the multinational 
if the decrease in price difference between the two products is less than the willingness to pay for 
quality (or marginal rate of substitution between income and quality) of the marginal consumer. 
In other words, the equilibrium marginal consumer will switch to buying the local good with 
a DCR if the gain in utility from purchasing the higher quality MNC good is smaller than the 
loss in utility due to its higher price. Thus, the MNC price relative to the local good hasn’t 
fallen enough to induce the marginal consumer from buying the MNC good.
2.3.4 Profits o f Local Firm:
As discussed earlier, there are two effects of a content requirement on the local firm. A linkage 
effect, which tends to increase the profits of the local firm and a competition effect which 
tends to lower profits. The net effect will depend on the relative strengths of these two effects. 
Below we derive the interesting case when profits of the local firm will increase with a content 
requirement. Given our results above, this can happen only when the gains from the increased 
demand for the local good outweighs the losses associated with declining price-cost margins. 
We summarize these observations in the proposition below.
P roposition  2 : Profits of the local firm are increasing with domestic content requirements
if '■
i) Lemma 3 above holds
ii) The linkage effect is stronger than the competition effect, i.e., ^  (r — q) < [4 -
&1M1)
Proof.
In equilibrium, we have:
diri dpi dci dDi
dA S = i d A s -  d t e )D l +  (P1-  Cl)dA s
In order for this expression to be negative, i.e., profits of local firm to increase with quality 
downgrading:
We want
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dpi dci
dAs dAs
Lemma 3 gives us conditions under which < 0 
For the first expression to be negative, we have:
dpi dci
dAs dAs
From Lemma 1, (6 — 26) >  0 
Rearranging,
where the LHS gives the competition effect, i.e., fall in price of MNC good due to shifting 
from foreign to domestic inputs; and the RHS gives the linkage effect. ■
2.3.5 Consumer Welfare:
We can divide the consumers in the economy into 2 groups - those who buy the multinational 
good, and those who buy the local good. When a content requirement is imposed, the quality 
downgrading by the multinational has two effects on consumers. First, the linkage effect which 
reduces costs and therefore prices of the firms. Second, an intensification of price competition 
due to smaller differences in quality. Different groups in the population are affected differently. 
For the consumers who were buying the multinational good, the downgrading of quality leads 
to a loss in utility. However, the reduction in price increases utility. For the consumers buying 
the domestic good, both the linkage effect and the competition effect lead to reduction in prices 
which increases utility. So the consumers buying the local good are unambiguously better off 
with a content requirement. The net result on overall consumer surplus depends on the strength 
of the two effects, the taste for quality of the consumers, and the weight given to the different 
segments of the population. Below we show conditions under which a content requirement will 
improve consumer welfare.
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Let equilibrium prices be given by Pi,P2 
Let:
U\ be the utility of individuals consuming the local good,
U2 be the utility of individuals who consume the multinational good. 
These are given by:
Ui =  0s\ -  pi
U2 =  OS2 ~ P2
The utility of the two subgroups in the population, are weighted by their individual pro­
portions in the population to get the total consumer surplus:17
c s = i ^ e u ' + i r i u > (2-25)
Since the marginal consumer 6 is given by
2  P 2 - P i
e =  - K T
Utility of the 2 subgroups are given by:
6
Ui =  J  ( 0 s i - Pl)dB (2.26)
6
6
u2 =  J {e s i - P i )d 9  (2.27)
d
Thus, we can use equations (24), (25) and (26) to see how consumer surplus changes with
17 Here the weights change with the content requirements as demand for the two goods change. Different 
weights on the two groups can generate different results than what we obtain. For example, a large weight 
given to the rich consumers buying the multinational good may cause consumer surplus to decrease as content 
requirements are imposed. The weights, of course, will be determined by political economy considerations.
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a DCR:
P roposition  3: A sufficient condition, for consumer surplus to be increasing with DCR is:
i) The maximum taste for quality among consumers, i.e. 9 , is not too high
ii) Lemma 2 is satisfied, i.e., relative prices fall with a DCR , i.e., >  0 
Proof. See appendix.
The foregoing analysis suggests that consumer surplus with DCR is higher:
i) The lower is the maximum taste for quality of consumers
ii) The greater are linkage effects.
iii) The lower is the price difference between the two goods, i.e.e, the price of the multina­
tional good falls more than the price of the local good, > 0).
iv) The larger the weight the policy-maker puts on the L group.
2.3.6 Simulations
In order to understand the mechanisms of the model and its predictions, we simulate the 
model.18 Figure 2.1 shows the existence of linkage effects. As the fraction of domestically 
sourced inputs by the MNC increases, i.e., content requirement increases, the upstream price 
index falls, though at a declining rate. This demonstrates that linkage effects are larger ini­
tially. Figure 2.2 shows the effects of increasing the fraction of inputs sourced locally by the 
multinational on local firm profits. The initial increase in profits is due to cost savings through 
linkage effects outweighing the increase in competitive pressure from the multinational. Profits 
start falling as competition gets more intense as the multinational downgrades quality. Figure 
2.3 displays effects on consumer surplus. The increase in DCRs leads to the MNC downgrading 
its quality. Consumers buying the high quality MNC good now face a loss in utility. Since 
competition effects are weak initially, effects on prices are not very strong and hence the loss 
in consumer surplus from lower quality exceeds the gain from lower prices. Once competition 
gets more intense, the price effect dominates and consumer surplus increases with the fraction 
of inputs sourced locally.
18 See appendix for the parameter values used.
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2.4 Discussion
The above analysis and the simulations show that there is a range of values for content re­
quirements which increase host country welfare. A DCR has a differential impact on different 
groups in the population. The upstream supplier industry is unambiguously better off due to 
the increased demand for inputs. Since the upstream sector is monopolistically competitive, 
according to the model, the growth of the sector is essentially an increase in the number of 
firms. Hence, a DCR can encourage industrial growth.
The second group we consider are consumers. As Proposition 3 shows, if the taste for 
quality in the population in not too high, i.e., there are relatively few people who purchase 
the high quality MNC good, and if policy-makers assign equal weightage to all segments of the 
population, then a DCR improves consumer welfare. This result arises primarily due to the 
lowering of prices through the linkage effects, and an intensification of price competition.
For local producers competing in the same industry, a DCR can lead to an increase in 
profitability if the reduction in costs due to the linkage effects outweigh the fall in price-cost 
margins due to an intensification of price and quality competition.
Since a content requirement has a differential impact on different groups in the population, 
the overall host country welfare will depend on weights attached to the various groups. Hence, 
there is potential for conflict between the different groups. Local producers will likely oppose 
DCRs as it increases competitive pressures on them. Consumers with a high taste for quality 
will also oppose them as they suffer from quality downgrading by the MNC. Consumers of the 
local good will support DCRs as they gain from lower prices.
We now turn to discussing the effects of the main parameters of the model. From the 
above analysis, we find that host country welfare is increasing for a range of values of \l\  - the 
input output co-efficient of the multinational. A higher implies greater linkages. Clearly, 
the upstream industry expands due to the increase in demand. From the downstream industry 
local firm’s perspective, greater linkages translates into lower price for domestic inputs. Since it 
buys all its inputs locally, its costs are reduced. So long as linkage effects dominate competition 
effects, the local firm’s profits will increase. For domestic consumers, greater linkages means 
reduced prices of final goods, as costs of both firms are decreasing. Hence, consumer surplus is 
increasing for a range of values of fi*-
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The model also shows that the lower is 0, i.e., the highest taste for quality in the population, 
the greater are the benefits from domestic content requirements. If 6 is low, the willingness to 
pay for quality is not high in the population, and thus, the loss in welfare due to the MNC 
downgrading its product will be lower. Both consumer surplus and profits of the local firm are 
increasing with domestic content requirements, the lower is 0 . Since taste for quality can be 
interpreted as income distribution, the implication is that the benefits from a DCR are greater, 
the lower is the purchasing power of the richest segment of the population.
Finally, the higher the cost of quality upgrading for the multinational (lower a), the higher 
the domestic welfare - if taste for quality is low in the population. For local producers - when 
cost of upgrading is high (a is low) a domestic content requirement means the MNC sources 
a large fraction of inputs domestically. If foreign prices are larger than domestic prices, the 
MNC’s costs are falling, and thus, his prices are falling. This means more competition for the 
local firm, and lower profits. For consumers - the fall in prices of the MNC increases consumer 
surplus. The lower is a the higher is i.e., the decrease in the price difference in the two 
goods due to a DCR. The higher is 25^, the greater is the consumer surplus. This result has 
the interesting implication that a DCR will benefit those industries more where it is relatively 
expensive for the MNC to differentiate its good in quality.
In this chapter, we have focused on the host government imposing a content requirement on 
the MNC. In practice, one can also think of the MNC itself imposing this condition on itself by 
binding itself into contracts with domestic suppliers.19 In so doing, the MNC is committing itself 
to buying a certain value or quantity of inputs from local upstream producers so as to encourage 
their development and to be able to reap the benefits of cheaper and/or better quality inputs 
through the development of the upstream industries. These contracts with suppliers would have 
similar consequences as the imposition of a DCR discussed above.
There is some evidence from India which supports the theoretical claims made in this chap­
ter. As mentioned eaxlier, the Indian government requires that all multinational producers of 
passenger cars should source at least 50 percent of inputs locally. Since India did not receive any 
investment from car manufacturers prior to the 1991 reform, this restriction was inconsequen­
tial. The DCR has been significant since the entry of foreign car producers such as Daewoo,
19See Matouschek (2001)
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Hyundai, and Ford in the 1990s. During 1991-97, the automotive components industry in India 
grew at a compound annual rate of 26.4 percent. These figures do not by themselves establish 
a causal link between DCRs and auto components industry growth. However, they do suggest 
that growth in the upstream stream industry was accelerating at the same time that DCRs 
were strictly being imposed in the downstream sector.
This chapter has argued for a domestic content requirement as a means to generate pecuniary 
externalities. One can also think of other policy instruments which could achieve this goal. One 
such instrument could be an investment subsidy to MNCs so as to induce them to source more 
inputs locally. The model sketched out in Section II above could be suitably amended to include 
this policy tool. The firms’ profit maximisation would then be affected, which would then have 
implications for the optimal subsidy.
2.5 Conclusions
The growing literature on FDI views multinational activity as potentially beneficial for the 
host country due to several reasons, prominent among them are technology transfer, quality 
upgrading, and spillovers through the labour market. This chapter explores the benefits to the 
local economy through another channel - pecuniary externalities through linkages by combining 
vertical product differentiation models with two-sector linkage models. The chapter argues for 
a potential role for policy in increasing linkages by means of a Domestic Content Requirement. 
Stipulating minimum fractions to be sourced locally by a multinational encourages linkages and 
increases competition. As long as the taste for quality in the population is not too high, these 
effects can lead to increases in host country welfare and can be crucial in stimulating industrial 
growth in developing countries.
Several limitations to the analysis remain. First, the important process of quality upgrading 
is not explicitly modeled. This chapter has focused on quality downgrading by the MNC due to 
a DCR. An interesting extension of the model would be quality upgrading by the local firm due 
to the presence of the MNC. Second, the issue of multinational entry is not addressed. Third, 
we abstract away from trade considerations in the downstream sector. Fourth, since this is a 
partial equilibrium analysis, the claims on overall welfare are only tentative. Fifth, we do not
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model political economy issues related to the potential conflict between consumers of the high 
quality MNC good, local downstream producers, and the rest of the population. Extending the 
model to resolve some of these issues are the objective of future research.
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Chapter 3
Characteristics o f M N Cs in Indian  
Industry
3.1 Introduction
India liberalised its FDI regime in 1991, and consequently saw a dramatic upsurge in FDI 
inflows. Annual inward FDI increased from 200 million in 1991 to $3.2 billion in 1997. As 
multinational presence has increased in Indian industry, there is a need to understand the 
nature of such activity. With this aim, this chapter presents a descriptive analysis of MNC 
activity in India. Later chapters use these characteristics of the data in more formal econometric 
analysis. In particular, later chapters analyze the effects of MNC entry on the performance of 
local firms, and the decision to export. Before undertaking such an analysis, we seek a detailed 
understanding of the nature of MNC activity.
This chapter concentrates on three sets of issues regarding multinational activity in Indian 
industry. First, the sectoral destination of MNC investment. Which industries have been 
recipients of FDI in the 1990s and what are their characteristics - in terms of importance of 
technology, market structure, orientation, skills and wages. The next set of issues concern the 
characteristics of MNCs relative to Indian firms. How do MNCs compare with local firms in 
terms of size, costs of production, wages, export and import orientation, amount spent on R&D 
and Advertising, and linkages generated with the domestic economy? The final set of issues 
deal with the performance of multinationals relative to local firms in the post-reform period in
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terms of profitability. We seek to understand whether there is any persistence in profits, and 
the distribution dynamics of profitability.
There are some underlying themes which the analysis in this chapter seeks to address. We 
would like to ascertain whether FDI in India is of the horizontal or the vertical type.1 Are 
MNCs coming into India to avail of cheap factor costs, or to take advantage of the market 
size and produce for the Indian market? A central theme is whether MNCs are consistently 
outperforming their local rivals, and if so to disaggregate performance within ownership groups 
to understand which firms are driving the performance differentials. In addressing the above 
issues, the objective of this chapter is to present some stylised facts about FDI in India during 
the reform period, some of which are explored in Chapters 4 and 5 below.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we describe the dataset
which is used for the analysis in this^bant t V i r > o i o  'T ' l u - w  f / - \ l  1
a continuous monitoring of company announcements and a qualitative understanding of the 
group-wise behaviour of individual companies.
Prowess organises companies into economic activity groups. This is done under an economic 
activity classification system which classifies companies based on the share of the various prod­
uct and service lines in the total income of the Company. A Company is classified under a 
product/service group if more than half of the Company’s sales is derived from the products 
under such a group. If a company cannot be classified under any of the industry groups in such 
a manner, then the company is classified as a diversified company.
For each firm, we have data on various measures of profits, assets - fixed as well as total, sales 
- gross and net, total costs of production, exports, imports - broken down by raw materials, 
intermediate, and capital goods, breakdown of costs of production into wages, advertising, 
R&D, marketing and distribution among others. There is also data on gross and net value 
added and value of output.
We drop companies where industry or year is not specified or there are two observations for 
a particular year. In this way we drop 362 observations. We clean up the data by removing 
firms with negative sales or negative costs of production. We also remove very small firms ( 
< 0.1 crore rupees of gross fixed assets) as a significant proportion of their ratios are highly 
volatile, and implausible outliers - firms with profits/losses or costs of production greater than 
20 times net sales or assets. In this way we drop 1317 observations. We further delete 186 
observations on industries with less than 4 firms, as we believe the firms constitute only a small 
part of the industry, and hence are not representative of the industry.
The limitation of the dataset is that since it is based primarily on listed companies, several 
private companies, unlisted multinationals, small and unregistered firms are missing from the 
dataset. Further, there are issues of industrial classification as mentioned above, as multi- 
product firms are allocated to individual industries based on the share of sales in different 
products. There are also issues of sample selection, as the sample is based on listed companies 
which are non-random. Large firms are likely to be overrepresented. Hence, our results in the 
more formal hypothesis testing will be affected by sample selection problems. We discuss the 
implications of these data issues in the interpretation of our results in the econometric analysis 
of later chapters.
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3.3 Sectoral D estination of FDI
In the 1990s, FDI in India has grown from an extremely small base. In 1991, the total stock 
of FDI stood at less than 0.6 percent of GDP. By 1997, the stock of FDI had grown to about
2.5 percent of GDP. In terms of flows, FDI annual flows as a percent of manufacturing GDP 
has grown from less than 0.4 percent in 1991 to about 5 percent of manufacturing GDP in 
1997. Further, aggregate FDI numbers in India have systematically been under-reporting the 
importance of FDI. It does not include reinvested earnings, which tends to comprise large 
portions of FDI in other emerging countries. Some recent corrections for this suggest that 
official aggregate FDI numbers might be under-reporting actual FDI by as much as 50 percent.
Given that there has been a large increase in FDI in the 1990s, a natural question that arises 
is which sectors have been the recipients of this FDI. The sectoral destination will enable us to 
distinguish the type of FDI that has been flowing into India from 1991-97. The primary source 
for this data is the Secretariat for Industrial Assistance Newsletter, Department of Industrial 
Policy & Promotion. Table 3.1 shows the sectoral distribution of FDI approvals from 1991-97. 
It also shows the stock of FDI in 1980 and 1990.
The government policy pursued until 1991 generally restricted FDI to technologically inten­
sive branches of manufacturing industry. Hence 85 percent of FDI stock in 1990 was in manufac­
turing. In the 1990s however, the bulk of the inflows have been directed to non-manufacturing 
infrastructural sectors such as energy (29%) and telecommunication services (20%) as is evident 
from Table 3.1. The share of manufacturing has gone down to 37%. Among the manufactur­
ing subsectors, FDI approvals in the 1990s are also more evenly distributed unlike the heavy 
concentration in relatively technology intensive sectors upto 1990. The infrastructural sectors 
which have commanded nearly half of total approved investments in the 1990s had not been 
open to FDI inflows before, and hence, could be attributed to the policy liberalisation.
To distinguish further the type of FDI inflows into India in the 1990s we match the sector- 
wise FDI approvals data from the SIA with a classification scheme used by the OECD Direc­
torate of Science, Technology and Industry, Economic Analysis and Statistics Division. This 
classification groups manufacturing sectors according to different technologies, wages, orienta­
tion, market structure, and skills. Table 3.3 lists the classification scheme and the corresponding
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percentage of FDI inflow into the sector.3
1) Technology - High and medium technology sectors have been the beneficiaries of two- 
thirds of all FDI approvals. Given the historical bias for orienting approvals towards high 
technology industries, there has been a significant increase in the importance of low technology 
industries, especially petroleum refineries and food, beverages and tobacco.
2) Wages - Only a quarter of FDI approvals are destined for low wage sectors. Given that 
India has a large surplus of cheap labour, the relatively lower approvals suggests that the type 
of FDI coming in may not be driven by cheap factor costs. High and medium wage industries 
such as chemicals, petroleum refineries, and telecom have been relatively favoured. It may also 
reflect the outcome of the policy choice of no automatic approval of FDI in industries such as 
Wood, Leather, and much of Textiles.
3) Orientation - Table 3.3 shows that specialised supplier and scale intensive industries have 
received over 80 percent of approvals. This is further evidence to suggest that resource and 
labour intensive industries, in which India is supposed to have a comparative advantage, have 
tended to be less favoured by incoming FDI.
4) Market Structure - In Indian industry MNCs have come into differentiated goods indus­
tries, both fragmented and segmented (about three-quarters of all approvals). This follows the 
pattern in other emerging countries where MNCs normally have a comparative advantage in 
differentiated goods industries, due to the importance of intangible assets in these industries. 
MNCs can take advantage of their intangible assets such as higher R&D spending, Advertising 
costs and other spending which differentiate their goods relative to local firms.
5) Skills - FDI approvals during the 1990s have tended to occur more in skilled sectors such 
as chemicals, and telecom, than unskilled industries. Given India’s large ratio of unskilled to 
skilled workers, there has been no bias in favour of unskilled worker industries.
Although any classification scheme is ultimately arbitrary, the above does provide a useful 
categorisation of FDI approvals, and some qualitative evidence in favour of the hypothesis that 
FDI in India in the 1990s has been of the horizontal type as investors have favoured medium
3 Since the classification scheme only covers manufacturing, whereas FDI approvals data is for all sectors, the 
numbers in table 3 represent the percentage of approvals for Manufacturing, Oil Refinery, and Telecommuni­
cations. It does not include the Power and Services sector which cumulatively contributed about 26% of all 
approvals.
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technology, high-wage, specialised supplier, scale intensive, differentiated goods, and skilled 
labour industries which are industries in which developed source countries have a comparative 
advantage. For investments of the vertical type, we would have expected industries to be 
characterised by low wages, resource and/or labour intensive, and unskilled worker industries. 
Lack of FDI in resource and labour intensive industries where India might be thought to have 
a comparative advantage seems to suggest that foreign firms are choosing to serve the Indian 
market via local production rather than exports, and producing goods roughly similar to those 
produced for the home market.
Although the above information on sectoral destination provides a broad overview of the 
industries favoured by FDI in the 1990s, it must be borne in mind that the data above is for 
approvals only and not actual inflows. Given that the ratio of approvals to inflows has on 
average been about 20 percent (see Table 3.2), approvals data might not accurately reflect the 
actual investments taking place. Further, FDI in India has systematically been under-reported. 
It does not include reinvested earnings, which tends to comprise large portions of FDI in other 
emerging countries. Hence we turn to the Prowess database described above which is a sample 
of actual inflows in industry. There axe several advantages to the dataset. First, it measures 
foreign ownership based on direct information on production activity rather than financial 
flows.4 Second, we have data on actual activity of foreign firms rather than simply approvals. 
Third, we have information on activity of MNCs before and after the reforms.
From the data base we can also look at the share of MNCs in Assets and Sales in different 
sectors. Table 3.4 shows the incidence of MNCs in different sectors. There is wide variation 
in the presence of MNCs in different sectors. They are more prevalent in Leather Products, 
Chemicals, Mineral Products, Electrical and Non-electrical machinery and Transport Equip­
ment. These are actual inflows and somewhat corroborates evidence from the approvals data 
from the SIA. However, this information also includes MNCs present before liberalisation. We 
discuss the subsectors in which FDI has entered in the 1990s in greater detail in Chapter 4 
below.
4 See Griffith (1999) on this.
53
3.4 Characteristics
This section describes the characteristics of MNCs in Indian industry relative to Indian firms. 
As Chapter 1 discusses, theory suggests that MNCs in developing countries have certain char­
acteristics. Here we seek to determine whether these are borne out in the Indian context.
Using the firm-level database described above, we aggregate across all industries to get a 
composite picture of firm characteristics by ownership. Table 3.5 lists the aggregate cross-section 
characteristics.
3.4.1 Size
For ascertaining the relative size of firms, we employ two measures - Total Assets and Net 
Sales. Table 3.5 shows that multinationals in Indian manufacturing are larger both in terms of 
Total Assets and Net Sales than their local counterparts. They also have larger Fixed Assets 
than local firms. MNCs are almost twice as large as local firms in terms of Assets, and almost 
three times as large in terms of Sales. This finding seems to correspond well with the existing 
literature in which both theory and evidence point to MNCs being larger than local firms.
3.4.2 Export & Import Orientation
An important variable of interest in investigating the characteristics of multinationals is their 
propensity to export and import relative to local firms. Evidence from Table 3.5 suggests that 
multinationals both export and import more than local firms. This may be due to the larger 
relative size of foreign firms. Hence we normalise imports/exports by net sales. We find that 
the difference in openness between the two ownership groups disappears. A mean comparison 
test cannot reject the hypothesis that the export and import intensity of the MNCs and local 
firms are similar.
Figure 3.1a plots the export intensity of foreign and local firms over time. As the figure 
shows, there’s been a clear increase in exports in the post-reform period for both groups of firms. 
This could be due to more export-oriented firms entering, surviving firms exporting more, a 
reallocation of market share towards more export oriented firms, or due to the exit of firms. 
Chapter 5 seeks to answer these questions by formally decomposing export intensity growth.
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Looking at the evolution of import intensity (Figure 3.1b), we find that it has been rising for 
both ownership groups in the immediate aftermath of the reforms. However, for local firms, the 
ratio of imports to sales has been falling at the end of the sample period. Clearly, the extensive 
macro economic and trade policy reforms starting from 1991 seems to be the underlying reason 
for the increase in exports and imports for all firms. Towards the end of the sample period, 
even though absolute imports for local firms has grown, import intensity has declined as sales 
growth has been bigger. There may be some substitution of local for foreign inputs may be 
going on due to better availability of inputs locally. However, these are aggregate numbers and 
may be hiding significant variation within firms and industries which needs to be explored.
To understand the propensity of firms to export in different industries, we graphed export 
intensity by industry before reforms and after reforms. Figure 3.2 plots overall export intensities 
in 1990 and 1996. The figure seems to suggest that there have not been large changes in the 
distribution of export intensities across industries. In other words, although a few sectors such 
as software seem to have had a significant increase, rather than a move towards concentration 
of exporting activity within certain sectors, the entire distribution appears to have shifted 
upwards. We attempt to answer the evolution of these patterns in Chapter 5.
To investigate the importance of MNC presence for exporting activity, we ranked industries 
by MNC market share, and plotted the corresponding export intensities. Figure 3.3 shows 
that there is little correlation between MNC market share in industry and exporting activity in 
that industry. The co-efficient of correlation between the two variables turns out to be slightly 
negative. Chapter 5 picks up on this issue and seeks to test whether greater MNC presence in 
an industry increases the probability that a firm in the industry will export.
3.4.3 Costs of Production &: Wages
Table 3.5 shows that MNCs have lower average costs than local firms. A means comparison test 
shows that MNC costs of production per unit sales is almost 10 percent lower than that of local 
firms. Figure 3.4 displays the evolution of average costs over time. MNCs have consistently 
performed better than local firms over the sample period. Thus, there is some indication that 
MNCs may be more efficient than local firms in terms of lower average costs. However, these are 
aggregate numbers with wide variation across firms and industries, which needs to be explored.
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The data shows that MNCs pay higher total wages than local firms. Even as a proportion 
of costs of production, MNC wages are slightly higher. This corresponds well with the earlier 
finding that MNC presence has tended to be in medium to high wage industries rather than low 
wage ones. Evidence from other countries suggests that MNCs employ a larger share of skilled 
workers, thus leading to higher total wages. However, wages comprise less than 15 percent of 
the overall cost of production. This finding suggests that wages are not a primary component 
of costs in Indian manufacturing.
3.4.4 R&D and Advertising
Table 3.5 shows that as a proportion of sales, MNCs spend more on advertising as well as 
marketing & distribution than local firms. This squares well with the literature and the earlier 
finding that MNCs are present in industries with high barriers to entry and sell differentiated 
goods, which are both characterised by high advertising and marketing & distribution costs. 
The surprising finding is that they’re spending less on R&D as a proportion of sales than their 
local counterparts.5 This could be because they are concentrating their R&D activities at 
headquarters and not in the host economy.
3.4.5 Linkages
To get some measure of the linkages generated with the local economy, we consider the propor­
tion of imported inputs as proportion of sales. Table 3.5 shows that MNCs and local firms have 
similar ratios of imported inputs to sales. We would expect MNCs to source a larger fraction 
of inputs from abroad, due to its very nature. It would have been useful to compare imported 
inputs to total inputs. However, the information on total inputs is unavailable. MNC imports 
may actually be hiding intra-firm transfers from the parent to the subsidiary, which could bias 
the ratio downwards for MNCs.6
5 A comparison of means test showed that the difference between local firm spending on R&D and MNC 
spending on R&D as proportion of sales is significant.
6 Over time, the evolution of imported inputs to sales for both firms follows a similar trend to the import 
intensity graph presented earlier, and is therefore not repeated
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3.5 Performance
To compare MNC performance with that of local firms, we essentially look at 2 measures : i) 
the ratio of Profits before Tax to Gross Fixed Assets, i.e., Return on Assets, and ii) the ratio of 
Profits before Tax to Net Sales, i.e., Profit Margins. Both these measures of performance are 
standard in the literature.
A large part of the literature on inward FDI has tended to focus on productivity as a 
preferred measure of firm performance. Studies have tended to use plant-level information on 
output, labour, and capital to measure productivity. One limitation of our dataset is the lack of 
information on labour. This is due to the fact that in India, firms are not required to report on 
the number of employees for listing on the stock exchange.7 Thus, our measure of performance 
reflects in part data limitations. However, it is of interest in itself to look at profitability as 
this would also capture the impact of intangible assets of the MNCs
Two other issues regarding profits need to be addressed. First, is the difference between 
accounting profits and economic profits. In general, these tend not to be the same, and hence 
claims on economic profits based on accounting profits are tenuous at best.8 However, the 
problem is mitigated somewhat by considering a longer time horizon of profits. Our panel data 
set thus is useful for this purpose.
Second, is the issue of transfer pricing. If MNCs are engaging in transfer pricing, then any 
comparison between local and MNC firms will be meaningless due to measurement errors in 
reported profits. However, Indian average corporate tax rates during the period were higher 
than corporate tax rates in America which proxies for the rest of the world. Thus, there was 
an incentive for MNCs to under report profits. To the extent that we find MNCs have higher 
profits, without transfer pricing, these profits would have been even higher. Hence, one can 
think of MNC profits as reported as a lower bound on actual profitability.
To understand performance differences, we first consider aggregate profits. In the next sub­
section we decompose profits into surviving, exiting and entering firms in order to understand 
the key drivers of performance over time. The rest of the section deals with the important issue
7Further, stringent labour laws provide incentives for even registered firms to misreport the number of their 
permanent employees.
8See Fischer & McGovern (1983) on this.
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of persistence in profits.
3.5.1 Aggregate Returns &; Margins
Figure 3.5a plots a time-series of average MNC and Local firm returns on assets weighted by 
their asset share. We see that over the period 1989-97, MNCs have, on average, consistently 
outperformed local firms. Figure 3.5b shows the evolution of weighted profit margins. The 
evolution of both returns on assets and return on sales are remarkably similar. The figure 
adequately captures the Indian business cycle - the recession of 1991-92, the expansion in the 
following 4 years, and then the fall in profits starting from 1996-97. However, these are aggregate 
numbers and mask differences in firm profitability within each broad aggregation. We divided 
industries into those with a substantial presence of MNCs (greater than 20 percent of assets) 
and those without. However, the profitability differences between local and MNC firms in the 
two sets of industries remained. We explore the differences across industries in Chapter 4 below. 
The rest of the section deals with the decomposition and distribution dynamics of aggregate 
profits.
3.5.2 Decomposition of Profits
Given the above, we would like to determine the factors behind this profitability difference and 
changes over time. Is it the case that entering MNC firms are more profitable than locals or that 
surviving local firms are performing worse than surviving MNCs. To get a deeper understanding 
of the forces underlying aggregate profitability, we decompose profitability during the period 
1989-1997. Aggregating across firms, overall profitability n  is defined as:
period, thereby raising overall profitability. Third, is it due to a reallocation of output to 
the most profitable firms. Fourth, can we explain the changes due to changes in the average
(3.1)
3
where Z ( j ) is gross fixed assets of firm j ,  and Z  is total fixed assets.
There are four potential contributors to changes in profitability. First, is it due to entering 
firms being more (or less) profitable. Second, have less profitable firms exited in the sample
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profitability of surviving firms.
We follow the decomposition procedure of Bailey, Hulten, Campbell (1992)9 and decompose 
aggregate profitability into the contributions of entering firms(n), exiting firms (x ), reallocation 
among surviving incumbents (s ), and profitability changes for surviving incumbents. Denoting 
the set of firms of each type as k — n ,x ,s  :
differ on average from that of surviving incumbents. The second term represents the corre-
across incumbent survivors. The fourth is the contribution of profitability changes within the 
incumbent survivors.
for survivors, which is negative. Reallocation amongst survivors is positive, while entry and exit 
are both negative. For MNCs, reallocation contribution is slightly larger than that of changes 
for survivors, but the former is negative, while the latter is positive. The entry contribution is 
small and negative. This suggests that surviving MNCs have gained in profitability, whereas 
new entering firms are contributing negatively. Reallocation amongst firms is such that it is 
not necessarily the most profitable which are getting bigger.
The decomposition exercise suggests four main results. First, aggregate profitability has 
come down from pre-reform to post-reform days, with the declines being driven by surviving 
local firms. Second, unlike their local counterparts, surviving MNCs have continued to make
9The authors cited here use the procedure for decomposing aggregate productivity growth for firms into its 
constituent elements.
10We perform the decomposition for the change between 1990-1996. This is representative of the profitability 
changes in the period.
The first term represents the profitability contribution from entrants whose profit levels
sponding profit contribution from firm exit. The third is the contribution from reallocation
Table 3.6 shows the results from the profitability decomposition for all firms, MNCs, and 
local firms.10 Observe that there are big differences in the contributions for profitability for 
MNCs compared to local firms. For local firms the largest contributor is profitability changes
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higher profits. Third, even though a large number of firms have entered during the period, 
especially domestic firms, they are too small to have a large impact on aggregate profitability. 
Fourth, reallocation of assets across firms is not necessarily such that more profitable firms are 
getting relatively bigger.
3.5.3 Persistence
Having established that MNCs are more profitable than their local counterparts, we would like 
to investigate whether these profit advantages are persistent. We would like to understand 
the persistence of above or below normal profits across the profit space. There is a large 
literature on persistence of company profits.11 The normal methodology is to regress profits 
on lagged profitability, with the co-efficient on the lag term giving a measure of persistence. 
The intercept can be interpreted as a measure of long-run profits. Mueller (1986) goes a step 
further and calculates intercepts for all firms, thereby getting a measure of long-run profits for 
each firm.
Here we use transition matrices and mobility indices to investigate the persistence in profits. 
These techniques have not been used before in studying persistence, and are ideal for exploring 
profit dynamics and mobility of firms across the profit space.
Transition Matrices Sz Mobility Indices
To understand the dynamics of profits we employ a model of distribution dynamics that has 
been widely used in the cross-country growth literature (Quah, (1993), (1996a), (1996b)). Here 
we closely follow Redding (1999) who uses it to model a country’s specialisation dynamics.
Conceptually, an ownership group’s pattern of profitability at a point in time, na, is char­
acterised by the cumulative distribution function of ttu across firms, Fat(7r). Corresponding to 
F0t(n), we may define a probability measure, 0of,
4>otQ =  Fot(ir)
where 0ot is the probability density function for profits across firms i in ownership group
11 See especially, Mueller (1990) and the chapters contained therein.
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o at time t. The dynamics of an ownership group’s pattern of profitability corresponds to the 
evolution of the entire cross-section distribution of 7r over time. Following Quah (1993) and 
Redding (1999), the evolution of the cross-section distribution is modelled using a stochastic 
difference equation,
(f>ot =  M*((f)0 t^_ i)U t)
where M* is an operator mapping disturbances (ut), and probability measures, into prob­
ability measures. Assuming that the mapping operator is time invariant and absorbing the 
disturbance into the operator definition, we have
4>ot =  M*(<j>o(t-i),iH) =  M*(M*(4>o^ -2)))
If we break up the possible values of ir into a number of discrete cells k 6 { 1 , K } , M* 
becomes a matrix of transition probabilities,
<f>ot+1 — M ^ o t M* =
mn rni2 
77221 777,22
r r iK l  777^2
777I X  
7772X
mKK
where (f>0t is now a K  x 1 vector
Hence, the above matrix essentially breaks up the profit space to enable us to look at 
persistence of profits at different profit levels. We can compare firms’ mobility within profit 
intervals in the transition matrices by using a mobility index. A common index is Shorrock’s 
Mobility Index:12
Shorrock's Index =
n — tr(n) 
7 7 — 1
(3.3)
!See Shorrocks (1978) and Quah (1996b)
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where tr(n ) is the trace of the matrix
and n is the no. of columns(rows) of the matrix.
A higher value for the index implies greater mobility across the profit space.
Here we employ two measures to discretize the profit space. The first measure chooses 
end-points of cells by breaking profit levels into equal intervals. This gives us a measure of 
overall distribution of firms across the profit space, and we name it as ’levels persistence’. The 
second measure chooses end-points of cells to assign an equal number of firms to each interval.13 
This measure gives us relative persistence of firms within the profit space, and we call it ’rank 
persistence.’
Levels P ersistence Table 3.7 reports transition probabilities and Shorrock’s Mobility Index 
for Local and MNC firms between year t and t - 1-1. We calculate an individual firm’s deviation 
from normal profits by subtracting the industry-year average from the firm’s returns. This 
return is then assigned to one of 7 intervals with range [—0.3, 0.5] and two intervals for all 
values above and below that range - to make a total of 9 intervals. Each entry p ij  in the matrix 
signifies the probability of a firm being in the jth  interval, given that it was in the zth interval 
in the previous period. The sum of the probabilities in each row is 1 (100 in our case for ease 
of illustration). We divide the sample into local and MNC firms and calculate the transition 
probability matrix for each group, pooling across the entire sample. Persistence is measured by 
the probabilities in the leading diagonal of the matrix.
Table 3.7 shows that persistence probabilities along the leading diagonal are higher for 
MNC than for local firms. By comparing the positive and negative segments of the matrix, 
we find that it is the positive above normal profits which are more persistent for MNCs than 
the negative ones. The Mobility Index also suggests that MNC above normal profits are ’less 
mobile’ between profit intervals than local firms. (A higher index value implies greater mobility 
across the profit space).
Figure 3.6 is a surface plot of the transition matrix. The figure reveals the triple peaked 
structure of profit persistence. If firm deviations from industry-year average profits is close to
13Quah (1996b) develops a software package in order to do this. Here, we code it as deciles of firms to get a 
similar result.
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zero, then they continue to tend towards the industry average in the following year. If firms 
are earning considerably higher or lower profits compared to the average, then the probability 
that they will continue to do so in the following time period is close to 0.4 for local firms, and 
0.5 for MNCs.14 Figure 3.6c plots the evolution of Shorrock’s Mobility Index for MNCs and 
Local firms. We find that mobility for MNCs has been lower than that for local firms in each 
year, except 1996.
We can test whether the transition matrices of the MNC and the local firm are similar. 
We employ a test based on Anderson and Goodman (1957). Our null hypothesis is that the 
Data Generating Process for the local firm transition matrix is equal to that of the null, which 
we assume to be the MNC transition matrix. Thus, f y  =  kj with fij being the null, i.e., the 
transition probability of the MNC; and lij is the probability of transition of the local firm.
Then, the transition probabilities for each state k have an asymptotic distribution x 2
-  f a )2 „  %2 { n _  i) 
z=i to
T - 1
and 9k =  ^  nk(t) 
t=o
where nk(t) denotes the number of firms in cell n at time t.
This test statistic holds for each state k =  1 ,....., N
Since the transition probabilities are independently distributed across states, we may sum 
over states, and the resulting test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a x 2(Af(iV — 1))
We find that we overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that the transition probabilities of 
local firms is equal to that of the null at the 1 percent level.
Thus, the transition matrix helps us in identifying three empirical regularities regarding 
persistence of profits. First, persistence of profits is not uniform among firms with differing 
’levels’ of profits. In particular, we find that there is a lot of persistence around zero profits, and 
at the tails of the profit distribution. Second, the persistence of profits for MNCs is greater than
14 To test for robustness, we calculated transition matrices for each year during the period 1990-97. The
matrices and the accompanying surface plots showed that our findings on overall persistence axe remarkably 
similar across years.
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that for local firms as evidenced from the lower mobility in the transition matrices, Shorrock’s 
Index, as well as the Andersen-Goodman test. Third, MNC above normal profits seem to 
persist more than local above normal profits as evidenced from the higher peak at the positive 
tail of the distribution. To understand these empirical regularities further, we investigate rank 
persistence.
R ank P ersistence One caveat for the peaks at the two tails of the profit distribution is that 
this might simply be due to the manner in which we’ve discretised the profit space, and chosen 
the arbitrary profit intervals. We are perhaps lumping together firms with very large differences 
in profits in one interval. Hence, even though firms may be earning substantially higher profits, 
and these profits may be falling over time, but since the tail intervals are open-ended, they 
are not capturing this movement. Hence, instead of breaking up the profit space into discrete 
intervals, we assigned the firms into deciles according to their performance in a particular year. 
For example, if a firm’s profitability in a given year was in the highest 10 percentile of all firms, 
then it was placed in decile 10. Table 3.8a is a transition matrix analogous to table 3.7 above, 
except that here we compare the relative persistence of firms. In the top panel, the number in 
the first row and column shows the probability that an MNC which was in the 1st decile in one 
year, stayed there in the next year. The second column of the same row shows the probability 
of moving to the 2nd decile given that the firm was in the 1st decile the previous year, and so 
on. Table 3.8b shows the associated numbers of firms transiting from one decile to another.
The table again confirms two earlier observations. First that persistence is higher in the top 
and bottom deciles than in the middle deciles. Hence, high performers and poor performers 
tend to stay that way. Second, that MNC high performers are more persistent than local high 
performers. Figures 3.7a and 3.7b confirm this observation, as the peaks in the tails of the 
distribution are quite high. Note that the hump in the middle in the overall transition surface 
plot disappears. This is because there are a large number of firms earning close to zero profits, 
hence the range of profits that a firm needs to have to be in a particular decile is smaller. Thus, 
a small change in its profits moves it out of that particular decile and into another one, causing 
lower persistence in the intermediate deciles.15 To investigate this further, table 3.8c shows the
15We performed the same exercise using quintiles, and the results were very similar.
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summary statistics of the persistence in deciles. Column 1 shows the end-points of the deciles. 
Column 2 shows the median returns in the deciles. We plotted this column and the resultant 
figure 3.8c shows that the gap in median returns among local and MNCs are in the high deciles 
- namely from 7 onwards. Column 3 shows the annual median change in firm’s profits in a given 
decile. Again we observe that there has been significantly higher changes in the 8th and 10th 
decile for MNCs relative to local firms. Finally, column 4 displays the inter-quartile range. Here 
we notice how the ranges are high at the tails of the distribution and low at the middle. This 
confirms the earlier observation that for firms earning close to zero profits, a small absolute 
change in profits moves them into another decile. Hence there is less persistence in the middle 
deciles.
To summarise, we considered both the absolute persistence of profits across the profit space 
as well as the relative persistence of profits. The related transition matrices and surface graphs 
showed that
a) There is significant persistence in profits of firms.
b) Persistence of profits is not uniform among firms with differing ’levels’ of profits. In 
particular, we find that there is a lot of persistence around zero profits, and at the tails of the 
profit distribution.
c) The persistence of profits for MNCs is greater at the positive tail of the distribution than 
the negative one. Thus, MNC above normal profits seem to persist more than MNC below 
normal profits.
d) MNC above normal profits seem to persist more than local above normal profits.
e) The highest decile and lowest decile of performers tend to stay that way.
f) The profits of the highest MNC performers are more persistent than the profits of the 
highest local performers.
Thus, there is evidence to suggest that there is a group of MNCs which are persistently 
earning high profits, which are driving the difference in profitability between the two groups.
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3.6 Conclusions
The conclusions that can be drawn from the above analysis are the following. Using sectoral 
inflow data, we find some evidence that MNC activity in India is mostly of the horizontal type. 
This is based on three pieces of information. First, the type of industries in which they locate 
are primarily high-tech, high wage, scale-intensive and differentiated goods industries. Second, 
the share of wages in total costs of production are lower than 15 percent. Third, the sales of 
MNCs are concentrated in the domestic market, with fewer than 10 percent of sales going for 
exports.
Comparing the characteristics of MNCs versus local firms we find that they are larger in size, 
have similar export and import intensities as local firm, have lower average costs of production 
and pay higher wages, spend more on R&D and Advertising, and have similar proportions of 
imported inputs to sales. Considering the performance of the two ownership groups reveals 
that on aggregate MNCs have consistently outperformed local firms over the sample period.
The decomposition of profits shows us that changes in overall profits for local as well as 
MNCs are being driven by changes in average profitability for surviving firms. Even though the 
period has seen a lot of entry, the new firms are not having a large impact on aggregate profits. 
The interesting result is that whereas surviving local firms are getting less profitable, surviving 
MNCs on average are becoming more profitable. This could be due to efficiency differences or 
mobility barriers. This issue is explored in greater depth in Chapter 4 below.
According to the Schumpeterian concept of competition, firms earning above normal profits 
cause entry and then through the forces of competition and imitation see their profits erode. 
Successful firms are those which are continually innovating, whereas unsuccessful firms exit. 
There is thus a reversion towards the mean. We investigated the dynamics of profits in Indian 
industry. We found that there is a lot of persistence in profitability. There are a lot of firms 
earning close to zero profits at any given time. However, we find that persistence is particularly 
strong in the top and bottom deciles, i.e., the highest and poorest performers tend to stay that 
way. There are differences between MNC and local firm profits. The differences in aggregate 
profits between MNCs and local firms seem to be driven by the top performing MNCs earning 
persistently higher profits than the top performing local firms.
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Chapter 4
FD I Reform s and Local Firm  
Perform ance
4.1 Introduction
When the motivating force for FDI is proximity to final customers, then competition with local 
firms becomes a key issue. There is a large theoretical and empirical literature which looks at 
the effects of multinational entry on domestic competition. This chapter adds to that literature 
by providing new evidence from India on the impact of multinational entry on domestic firm 
performance.
One of the reasons why countries encourage inward foreign direct investment is that such 
activity fosters greater competition and therefore improves allocative efficiency in hitherto pro­
tected markets. The reasoning is that since MNCs tend to populate industries where barriers to 
entry are high, they may pare down monopolistic distortions and raise productivity of the host 
country’s resources by improving their allocation. In an economy such as India, with a history 
of state domination and stifling regulation of industry, such increases in competitive pressures 
can have substantial benefits.
The outcome of multinational entry on domestic industry performance is by no means 
clear-cut. There are at least five possible outcomes. First, if MNCs are more efficient than 
their rivals, the outcome would be a reduction in profit margins of domestic firms. Second, the 
MNCs coming in perform a different array of activities than local firms, claim moderate market
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shares and settle into a sort of market equilibrium without impacting local profit margins. 
Third, the MNC themselves drive out local firms, and then start reaping monopoly profits by 
restricting entry. Fourth, the multinational has a positive effect on market concentration, then 
all firms would be making greater profits. Fifth, if the MNC, lacking familiarity with local 
conditions is driven out of the industry without affecting local firm performance.
This chapter attempts to isolate the impact of multinational entry on domestic firm perfor­
mance in India by looking at the effects of the 1991 liberalisation of the FDI regime. Our results 
suggest that liberalising the FDI climate did indeed foster greater competition, as measured by 
declining local firm profit margins. This result is reassuring as it suggests that increased access 
by MNCs did enable greater competition thus leading to improvements in allocative efficiency.
4.1.1 Firm versus Industry View
Apart from the impact of MNC entry, a robust finding across several previous studies is that 
multinationals in India have earned persistently higher profit margins than their local counter­
parts.1 Our analysis in Chapter 3 above suggests that MNCs consistently outperform local firms 
in Indian industry in the time period under consideration. We seek to investigate the sources of 
these differences in performance. The conventional market structure-conduct-performance par­
adigm relates profitability to the degree of seller concentration and the height of entry barriers. 
However, entry barriers are industry specific and expected to protect all firms in the industry 
in proportion to their sales. Thus, the structure-conduct-performance framework does not help 
in explaining systematic intra-industry differences in profitability.
The ’firm’ versus ’industry’ debate in the 10 literature to the sources of firm profitability 
suggest that there could be two competing hypotheses explaining the superior performance of 
MNCs in India. According to the ’firm view,’ superior ability or entrepreneurship is the source 
of inter-firm differences in profitability.2 Hence, MNCs are more profitable due to greater 
efficiency than local firms. This could be due to MNCs possessing rent-yielding intangible 
assets as discussed in Chapter 1. These productivity differences would then allow pre-existing 
MNCs to continue deriving rents even with new entry into the industry.
^ ee  Kumar (1990)
2As first expostulated by Bain (1956) and developed by Demsetz (1973).
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Alternatively, the ’industry view’ states that inter-group differences in profitability can be 
explained in terms of strategic heterogeneity of firms. In particular, there are mobility barriers 
within an industry to the erosive forces of imitation, competition, and expropriation which allow 
some firms to earn persistently higher profits.3 According to this view, MNCs in India are not 
necessarily more efficient but form a strategic group within an industry which is protected by 
mobility barriers leading to higher profits.
The concept of strategic groups is based on the observation that there are alternative ways 
of doing business in an industry and that the strategy of firms in any particular industry 
differs in terms of the mode of competitive rivalry, degree of vertical integration, geographical 
extent of markets served, nature of distribution channels employed, breadth of product line 
etc. An industry is therefore composed of groups of firms, and firms in a group are similar 
to each other in terms of competitive strategy. One implication of this concept is that entry 
barriers are partly specific to the strategic groups and partly to the industry. The entry barriers 
not only impede fresh entry to the industry but also more importantly, restrict inter-strategic 
group mobility of existing firms. Hence these mobility barriers may be the source of persistent 
advantage and might explain the higher profit margins enjoyed by MNCs in the industry. The 
strategic differences between firms could be reflections of their tangible and intangible assets 
(Porter 1979) or alternative business strategies. For MNCs the intangible assets could be 
brand goodwill, proprietary technology, captive access to the parent’s research laboratories, 
reservoirs of organisational and managerial skills, and information networks. This might affect 
the structure of markets and domestic rivalry. Alternative business strategies include predatory 
pricing, the use of ’deep pocket’ advantages to promote non-price competition, the provision of 
intra-group services at below marginal cost, a willingness by the parent company to accept below 
normal profits and dividends from its affiliates, the manipulation of cross-border intra-group 
prices, and so on.
In this chapter, we distinguish between the firm view and industry view, by allowing new 
MNC entry. If the industry has mobility barriers with strategic groups of firms, then the 
existing MNCs would face renewed competition from the new firms and barriers would be 
reduced leading to lower profits. If the old firms continue to make high profits then there is
3See Caves and Porter (1977), and Ghemawat (1991) for an exposition of the ’industry view’.
71
evidence against the existence of such mobility barriers.
We find that the effect of liberalising the FDI regime has not had a significant impact on 
the existing MNC margins. Combining this result with the findings in Chapter 3 above suggest 
that our findings are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that efficiency differences are the 
source of higher MNC profitability.
As discussed in Chapter 1, India liberalized its foreign investment regime in 1991, as part 
of a larger macro-economic reform and structural adjustment program after being faced with 
a severe balance of payments crisis. In that sense, the timing for reform was exogenous. The 
need for foreign exchange to counter large scale losses in external reserves was the precipitating 
factors for changes in the FDI regime rather than any particular stage in the evolution of the 
selected industries. Hence, they provide an ideal experiment in which multinationals enter a 
previously protected domestic industry.
In keeping with the experimental design, we can identify a set of industries in which FDI 
was encouraged. These form our treatment group. On the other extreme we use a set of 
industries where FDI was particularly discouraged. Firms in these industries were subject to 
compulsory industrial licensing due to strategic, national, and environmental reasons. These 
industries form our control group as they experienced little effects of the changes to the FDI 
regime. By exploiting the differences between these two groups of industries we can attempt to 
identify the impact of the easing of FDI entry restrictions.
We use a firm-level panel data set which includes observations before and after reforms to 
get around some of the identification issues. By exploiting differences within an industry before 
and after the reforms, we can better estimate the impact of FDI. We also provide evidence on 
whether different firms are affected differently by certain kinds of reforms.
In this study, we use firm profitability as a measure of firm performance. A large body of 
recent empirical work has used productivity as the variable of choice in measuring the impact of 
FDI competition. Our measure is in large part dictated by data limitations. Employment data 
at the firm-level in India is notoriously difficult to find. Hence measures of productivity would 
at best be indirect. Second, as a measure of firm performance, profitability would adequately 
capture any competitive pressure arising from the entry of multinationals.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the reasons why there
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may be differential impacts on MNCs and local firms. The next section provides the institutional 
details of India’s industrial reforms. Section 4 lays out a simple model of profitability. The 
following section explains the empirical methodology used. Section 6 presents the basic results. 
The next section discusses these results. Finally, section 8 concludes.
4.2 R elated Literature
MNCs have certain properties that make them distinct from other local competitors. Given 
the differences between these two groups of firms mentioned above, it is worth repeating here 
the theoretical consequences of these differences. The proprietary asset hypothesis about the 
basis for MNCs seems to suggest that they will compete in an industry in ways that use 
their proprietary assets to best advantage. Further, the MNC’s diversification allows it to 
undertake riskier activities than firms with fewer options for spreading their risks, and therefore 
might earn higher average profits. To the extent that MNCs tend to be larger than their local 
counterparts and are more geographically or industrially diversified they should be better able 
to take advantage of any economies of size and scope.
MNCs are generally more successful at protecting themselves against the adverse effects 
of environmental volatility and market failure. They do so by adapting their products and 
processes to customer requirements, price changes and technical developments, and by reducing 
their exposure to both technological obsolescence and reductions and fluctuations in demand. 
Further, because of their industrial and geographical spread, they have more flexibility than 
uninational or non-diversified firms in the sourcing of their inputs, in the relocation of their 
investments, and in the markets they choose to serve.They also attempt to counteract exchange 
risk by appropriate locational or intra-firm pricing policies.4 Evidence from the response of 
MNC affiliates to the economic recession in Columbia in 1980 suggests that in the following 
four years they displayed a speedier and more pronounced recovery pattern then their indigenous 
competitors (Atyas and Dutz, 1993). The authors ascribe this fact to the lower agency costs 
and less stringent liquidity constraints incurred by the foreign affiliates.
As a general proposition, one might expect that affiliates of MNCs will engage in more
4 See Dunning (1993)
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non-price competition than indigenous firms in the same industry. This is partly because the 
types and range of products of the parent company are likely to be different from those of firms 
in the host country, and partly because one of the main ownership advantages of MNCs is their 
possession of assets which encourage product differentiation and diversification.
A MNC new to a national market likely proves a disturbing competitive force. Any entrant 
is likely to disturb an industry with few sellers, but the MNC, lacking familiarity with local 
customs, is less likely to fall in with any prevailing pattern of co-operation. This prediction 
has been documented by the complaints of national rivals (Behrman (1970) provides examples). 
Domestic competitors’ reactions will include attempts to emulate or offset the proprietary assets 
brought by the foreign investor. On the other hand, as the subsidiary ages and ’’goes native,” 
its competitive manners improve as its market conduct becomes less distinguishable from that 
of domestically controlled enterprises.
Although the fact that MNCs possess proprietary advantages relative to local firms might 
suggest that they could be both more profitable and productive, there is no a priori reason 
why this should be the case. Dunning (1993) provides five reasons why one cannot predict 
the relative profitability of MNCs. First, foreign firms may be faced with certain competitive 
disadvantages vis a vis local firms in penetrating the latter’s markets. The second factor has 
to do with purposes of FDI. Dunning lists five types of FDI: resource based, market based, 
rationalised specialisation of products or processes, trade and distribution, and miscellaneous. 
Not all types of FDI will automatically lead to higher efficiency relative to local firms in the 
host country. The efficiency may be of secondary concern to MNCs that wish to safeguard 
their supplies of raw materials or intermediate products or acquire superior technologies or 
capabilities to advance their global strategic goals. Thus it is not necessary for MNCs to 
earn higher average rates of return than local firms. Third, although MNCs may be more 
efficient as suppliers of intermediate products, they are not necessarily better at adding value 
to these products than domestic firms. They may fail. Fourth, MNCs may use their ownership 
advantages to exploit a monopolistic position rather than to improve efficiency. An increase in 
productivity or profitability may accrue entirely to the investing company via means of transfer 
pricing, and will not be reflected in the performance of subsidiaries. Finally, MNCs may be 
satisfied by earning profits from an FDI project that are equal to its opportunity costs.
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4.3 Industrial Reforms
Ever since the late 1960s, Indian industry has been protected with a complex web of rules 
and regulations in the drive for nationalisation of ’strategic industries,’ and import-substitution 
policies. The era is infamously referred to as the ’licence-permit raj’ signifying the numerous 
licences and permits needed to operate industry. Multinationals, although having a presence in 
India since colonial times,5 were actively discouraged in this era. In 1991, faced with a severe 
balance of payments crisis the Indian government underwent a host of reforms to liberalise 
trade and industry. Prominent among these were the relaxation of rules governing foreign 
direct investment. As against the previous policy of considering all foreign investment on a 
case by case basis and that too within a normal ceiling of 40% of total equity investment, 
the new policy provided for automatic approval of FDI up to 51% of equity in a specified 
list of 35 high priority, capital intensive, hi-technology industries. The caveat was that the 
foreign equity covers the foreign exchange involved in importing capital goods, and outflows on 
account of dividend payments are balanced by export earnings over a period of 7 years from 
the commencement of production.
Foreign technology agreements were also liberalised for the 35 industries with firms left 
free to negotiate the terms of technology transfer without the need for government approval. 
Further, investment above 51% equity was also permitted on the basis of case by case approvals 
given by a specifically constituted Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) charged with 
expeditious processing of government approvals. The infamous Foreign Exchange Regulation 
Act (FERA) was amended to remove a number of constraints earlier applicable to firms with 
foreign equity operating in India and also to make it easier for Indian businesses to operate 
abroad.
India signed the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Convention and be­
came a member of MIGA along with many other developing countries interested in promotion 
of foreign investment.
The prohibition against the use of foreign brand name or trademark in goods sold in the
5 British multinationals were the most common during the era, with firms such as Burroughs-Welcome - 
(incorporated in 1912), ITC Ltd. - India’s 3rd largest company in 1997 started as Imperial Tobacco Company 
(1910), and Glaxo India (1924) operating as wholly-owned subsidiaries.
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domestic market was withdrawn. All industrial licensing was abolished, except for certain 
industries related to security and strategic concerns and concerns related to safety and overriding 
environmental issues.
On a cumulative basis, FDI approvals between April 1991 and September 1998 were of 
the order of $54,268 million whereas actual FDI during the same period was $11,806 million. 
Therefore, actual FDI as a proportion of FDI approved was only 21.7%. Yet, the amount was 
a quantum jump from the pre-liberalisation era.
The reforms in FDI approval were further augmented by changes in laws pertaining to 
industrial licencing. Under this notification, industrial undertakings were exempted from the 
operation of Sections 10, 11, 11(a) and 13 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 
of 1951. Section 10 refers to the requirement of registration of existing industrial units. Section 
11 refers to the requirement of licensing of new industrial undertakings. Section 11(a) deals 
with licences for the production of new articles. Section 13 refers, inter alia to the requirement 
of licensing for effecting substantial expansion.
The industrial policy had three schedules. Schedule I had a list of industries reserved for 
the public sector. Schedule II listed industries which were subject to compulsory licencing. 
Schedule III which was the articles reserved for the small scale/ancillary sector.
Given the above changes in industrial policy legislation, we can identify a set of industries - 
which are the high-priority industries where FDI was allowed through the automatic route. We 
can also identify a group of industries where FDI was discouraged, and which were subject to 
compulsory industrial licencing due to strategic, environmental, and national concerns. These 
two groups would then form the basis of our comparisons.
4.4 M odeling Profitability
The literature on modeling profitability is substantial. Given that our primary focus is on 
testing the effects of reforms, we require a fairly simple estimatable model of the determinants 
of profitability rather than rigorous structural estimation. Here we follow the modeling structure 
of Machin and Van Reenen (1993) for its simplicity and ease in estimation.
We assume that industries are not purely competitive, nor axe all firms in long-run equi­
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librium. Rather, an industry can be earning excess profits on account of barriers to entry of 
new firms. The industry includes firms of varying efficiency, their individual rates of profit 
accordingly distributed about the industry mean.
Ever since Cowling and Waterson (1976), a substantial amount of empirical work on the 
determinants of profitability have been based on versions of a homogeneous product oligopoly 
model. In this model the profit margin for a profit-maximising firm i is given as:
( ^ )  _ =  m i (1 +  Ai) /e  (4.1)
where S  is firm sales, is market share, A* is the conjectural variation term and e is the 
industry price elasticity of demand.
The critical component in formulating estimatable models is the treatment of the unobserved 
variable Clarke and Davies (1982) suggest that if firm i has a share mi , then the magnitude 
of the other firms’ output responses will be given by the ratio of their summed market shares 
to i’s share. Accordingly they model the conjecture term as A* =  a* (1 — m*) /m*
If we substitute this expression for A* in (4.1) we get:
 ^ =  [a* +  (1 -  a*) mi] /e  =  [(1 -  m^ati +  m*] /e  (4.2)
Profit margins here axe a weighted average of 1/e  and rrii/e which axe the margins under 
monopoly/perfect collusion and Cournot respectively. Here a* =  1 implies total collusion while 
<*i =  0 suggests Cournot behaviour. This formulation, as pointed out by Kwoka and Ravenscraft 
(1986) is empirically useful as the ol{ term only enters in an interactive fashion with (1 — m*).
In the above formulation, A is decreasing in mi so that larger firms have smaller conjectures. 
Clearly, this may not hold in practice. To allow for this possibility, we follow Machin & Van 
Reenen and use the more general formulation A* =  an  (1 — mi) /rrii-\- a^i {I/m i)
Here there axe two components shaping conjectures: the first is the Clarke-Davies strategy 
of matching output according to maxket share distributions and the second has conjectures 
shaped by own market share6. This generates:
6Schmalensee (1987) has also generalised the conjecture term as A* =  A+ 7 (m* — 1/iV) where N  is the number 
of firms in the industry
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. =  .[(1 -  m i)au  +  a 2i +  rrii] f e ........................................... (4.3)
which simplifies to (4.2) if a 2i =  0
To translate to an estimatable formulation we need to make a number of steps. First, we need 
to empirically model the a  coefficients in equations (4.2) and (4.3). In existing empirical work 
based on the Clarke-Davies approach, a  has been assumed to be a linear function of industrial 
concentration. Here, we use a more general approach in which the a  parameters are treated as 
a time-varying function of industrial variables such as concentration and import intensity, and 
previous profitability. This formulation of a  recognises that the gains from collusion are likely 
to be influenced by market structure and dynamic behaviour.
Secondly, traditional studies have been plagued by problems of omitted variable bias. For 
instance, there are a number of unobservable determinants of profits whose exclusion may seri­
ously bias estimated coefficients. By using panel data we can control for time-invariant unob­
servables via fixed effects. The firm specific fixed effect, 7* captures effects such as management 
style and corporate culture.
Defining the a  parameters in (4.3) as
otkit =  X'j t$ ki +  $ 2 (?r/5)i*-i (k =  2)
where X jt denotes the industrial variables of interest, equation (4.3) can be rewritten as:
(tt/s ) it =  7i+ 0i (-x /s ) it_ 1+ 0 2mit+X'j td3 + (( l- r r i i t)X ,j t )e4 +O5 ( l-r r iit) (tt/  s ^ ^ + v t+ u a  (4.4)
where uu is an i.i.d. error term and vt contains time-specific effects.
We can rewrite equation(4.4) above as:
(n /s)it =  7* +  <5i ( t t / s ) ^  +  82m it +  X'j t6z +  (m u X j ^  +  65mu ( n / s ) ^  + v t +  uit (4.5)
where the 8  parameters are simple functions of 6  parameters. This formulation is adopted 
as it is a standard model incorporating interactions between market share and other variables
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in the model.
Equation (4.5) is a fairly general model of profit determination and has the desirable prop­
erty of nesting a number of popular models in the existing literature. For instance, it can 
be compared to the conventional linear static models specified in the structure-performance 
literature by testing the restriction [<5i, 6 4 , 65] =  0.
A slightly weaker restriction [<$4, 65] =  0 simplifies the model to a standard linear model 
with a partial adjustment mechanism for margins.
The estimation strategy for equation (4.5) is discussed next.
4.5 Empirical M ethodology
We implement a difference-in difference estimation technique to ascertain the effects of industrial 
reforms on profitability. By analogy with the experimental terminology, we refer to those 
industries which have been subject to reform legislation as treatment industries and to firms 
in those industries as treatment firms. Similarly, we refer to industries which have not been 
liberalised as control industries, and firms within them as control firms. In the first level of 
differences, one can in theory subtract the value of the outcome variable of interest, in our 
case profitability, after the reforms from its value before the reforms. Since we can do this for 
both control and treatment, we get two sets of differences: A T7r for the treatment group and 
A c7r for the control group. By itself, AT7r, could be a misleading estimator of the laws’ impact 
since other changes contemporaneous with the laws affect this estimate. To deal with this, we 
introduce a second level of differences. If contemporaneous shocks affect treatment and control 
groups in roughly similar ways, then those shocks should also be contained in A c7t. One can 
therefore subtract Ac7r from the first difference A t tt to estimate the effect of the law.
The difference-in-difference model can be specified as:
7Tijt =  7i +  vt +  /3* treatm entj * postt +  ffiijt +  Vijt (4.6)
where i indexes firms, j  indexes industry, and t indexes time.
The dependent variable is our indicator of the effects of FDI reforms on firm performance, 
i.e., profitability. The right hand side variables include a firm fixed effect 7j, a year fixed effect
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vt, a series of control variables flijt, that vary over firms, industry, and time. Note that flijt 
includes the lagged dependent variable and the other explanatory variables in 4.5 above. The 
treatm ent j  is a dummy variable for an industry which has been subject to industrial reforms. 
The postt is a dummy for the period after reforms.
This methodology fully controls for fixed differences between the treated and non-treated 
firms via the firm fixed effects. The year dummies control for aggregate fluctuations. The 
estimate of the effect of FDI reforms is /3, the coefficient on the interaction term: change in 
outcomes after the reforms specific to firms in industries which have been subject to the new 
legislation.
The difference-in-difference model makes the counterfactual assumption that the treatment 
firms would show similar rates of profitability as the control firms if there were no reforms. 
While this assumption is not directly testable, we can test whether the treatment firms and the 
control firms showed similar characteristics in the pre-reform period. If we do find that they 
were indeed similar, it would suggest that our counterfactual assumption would be correct. 
As table 4.2 shows, the treatment and control group did have similar profit margins in the 
pre-reform period.
4.5.1 Estimating Profitability
The primary issue in estimating profitability (equation 4.6), is the lagged dependent variable 
which causes problems in getting consistent estimates by the usual panel data techniques. 
Specifically, since profit margins are a function of the firm fixed effect 7 i, lagged profits are 
also a function of 7 Therefore, a right hand regressor is correlated with the error term 
rendering the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent. For the fixed effects estimator, the 
Within transformation wipes out the 7*, but does not solve the problem of correlation between 
the regressor and the error term.7 The same problem occurs with the random effects GLS 
estimator.8
7To see this, note that the Within transformation means that the lagged dependent variable becomes - 
(7r/5)i,t_i — (7r/5')i._i where (n/S) i . - i  =  J{T — 1). But it will still be correlated with ua — Ui.
because (7v/S)itt - i  is correlated with Ui. by construction. (The latter average contains u a - i  which is correlated 
with (7r/S)i,t- i  )
See Nickell (1981) for the derivation of this asymptotic bias
8 See Baltagi (1995) for details
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An alternative transformation that wipes out the individual effects, yet does not create the 
above problem, is the first difference (FD) transformation. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest 
a methodology based on first differencing. They suggest using the dependent variable lagged 
two periods as an instrument for the first difference term of the dependent variable on the 
right hand side. These instruments will not be correlated with the first difference error term 
as long as the 77^  themselves are not serially correlated. This method leads to consistent but 
not necessarily efficient estimates of the parameters in the model because it does not take into 
account the differenced structure of the residual disturbances.
A more efficient procedure to estimate dynamic panel data models is the Arellano and 
Bond procedure. The advantage of this procedure relates to its efficient utilisation of available 
instruments. The procedure obtains additional instruments by utilising the orthogonality con­
ditions that exist between lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbances. Thus, 
more instruments can be used as the panel progresses yielding efficiency gains relative to other 
estimation methods.9 Hence, we use the Arellano-Bond technique in what follows.
For comparison purposes we also present estimates for the OLS, and fixed effects estimators.
4.5.2 Data
We use the Prowess database described in Chapter 3 above. There is balance sheet information 
on firms for the period 1989-1997. Hence, this covers the reform period which began in 1991. 
The data allows us to distinguish between multinationals and local firms. It also has information 
on profitability, sales, size, and imports.
The firms are grouped under 127 industries at the 3 to 4 digit level on the Indian classification 
scheme called Indian Trade Classification (Harmonised System), based on the major activity of 
the firm. Firms which don’t have any one major activity are classified as ’Diversified’.
The list of industries which were allowed automatic approval for upto 51% foreign equity is 
taken from Annex III of para 39 of the Handbook of Industrial Policy and Statistics, 1991-92. 
These high priority industries are then individually matched with the Prowess database to give 
us the ’treatment’ sample of industries in which FDI was encouraged. The industries are listed 
in table 4.1 (Treatment and Treatment2).
9 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for details.
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The ’control’ sample of industries is found by referring to the Industries Development and 
Regulation Act of 1951. This act lists industries which are reserved and not open to foreign 
direct investment for a) reasons of public interest; b) activities reserved for the small-scale sector; 
and c) polluting and strategic industries which require compulsory licensing. By matching this 
list with the database, we can extract 13 industries in which FDI was discouraged, and this 
forms our ’control’ group. We clean up the data by removing implausible outliers.
The measure of profitability we use is return on sales (profit margins) which is our dependent 
variable. Our measure for concentration is the C-4 ratio - the sum of the market shares of the 
largest four firms in the industry. Using alternative measures such as the Herfindahl index 
didn’t alter the results. We computed market share for each firm by using the ratio of its total 
sales to the industry’s total sales for the given year.10
4.6 Basic Results
Table 4.3 presents results of estimating equation (4.5). Columns (1) and (2) present results from 
using the Arellano and Bond estimation technique outlined above. The variable re fo rm sl is 
our first measure of industrial reforms. It takes a value of 1 if the firm belongs to a treatment 
industry, i.e., subject to liberalisation as discussed above.
We see that the co-efficient of the reforms dummy is negative and significant at the 1% level. 
The rest of the explanatory variables all have the expected sign and are significant. Thus, like 
much of the persistence of profits literature (Mueller (1990)), the dominant influence is lagged 
profitability which is very significant. A higher market share implies larger profitability, and 
concentration in the industry is positive and significant even after controlling for market share.11
Given that the sample period was characterised by significant trade reforms, which could 
have had an impact on firm profit margins, we need to control for the effect of trade policy. To 
capture the impact of trade reforms we include the import intensity of the industry as a right
10 Since each firm is classified in an industry based on its major activity, it is likely that some of its sales are in 
other industries. The market share of a firm would be overstated only if a larger fraction of its sales are in other 
industries compared to its rivals in its major activity industry. The classification of firms with large fractions of 
sales in different industries as ’diversified,’ reduces this problem.
11 Other variables prominent in the literature, such as R&D intensity, Capital Turnover ratio, Log of Initial 
Sales, Asset Growth in industry were also used as explanatory variables as part of X j t . These were not significant 
in any estimation, and hence are not reported here.
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hand side variable. We find that it is insignificant in all specifications.
To investigate the sensitivity of our results to our groupings of ’treatment’ and ’control’ 
industries, we constructed alternative ’treatment’ groups. We consider industries as treatment 
industries if they fulfil three criteria - i) they are on the list of high-priority industries; ii) there 
is some MNC presence in the industry in the industry; iii) there is at least one foreign firm which 
has entered the industry in the post-reform period. This criteria ensures that our treatment 
group has industries which axe not only open to FDI but have also actually seen some inflow 
occurring. We label this group as ’treatment2’ and a list of these can be found in table 4.1. 
The dummy associated with this treatment group is called reform s2.
Column (2) shows that reform s2  is negative and significant, indicating that among the 
treatment industries, if we consider those that have seen some multinational entry, there is a 
negative effect of reforms on profitability.
For comparison purposes we also present results from the OLS and Fixed Effects estimations 
in columns (3) and (4).12 Given the problems discussed earlier that these estimations suffer 
from, we nevertheless find the reform dummy - re fo rm s2  - significant in both regressions.
We test for identification by employing the Sargan test. The null hypothesis is that the 
parameters of the model are identified. We employed several different specifications to avoid 
overidentification. The specifications reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 pass the Sargan test, and 
hence the parameters are identified.
Since we have a differenced lagged dependent variable in the Arellano-Bond estimation, we 
need to check for second-order serial correlation in the error terms.. Our preferred models in 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 cannot reject the null of no serial correlation in the error terms.
4.6.1 M ultinationality
The results reported above were for all firms in the control and treatment groups. This aggre­
gation glosses over the difference in profitability within different groups of firms. The reforms 
may have affected the profits of different ownership groups separately. As mentioned earlier, 
India had a substantial presence of multinationals in colonial times, and even after the stringent
12 We also estimated equation (4.6) using the Anderson and Hsiao technique mentioned in the empirical section. 
Due to the efficiency loss in this technique, however, we did not find any explanatory variables significant. Hence 
we do not report the results.
83
controls on new entry, they continued to operate in industry. The existing multinationals in 
the industry could have been either more efficient to counter the threat of new entry or able to 
deal with the new competition to be unaffected by it .13 Hence, we split the sample into local 
firms and multinationals. The results are presented in Table 4.4.
Column (1) &; (2) show the results for the sample containing local firms. We find that 
both the reform dummies are negative and significant at the 1% level. When we consider only 
multinationals - as in column (3) Sz (4), we find that the reforms dummy becomes positive 
and insignificant. Hence, the reforms do not seem to have affected the profitability of existing 
MNCs in the industry.
4.7 Discussion
If foreign investment has any special virtue for increasing allocative efficiency, the profit rates of 
domestic firms should be inversely related (ceteris paribus) to the competitive pressure supplied 
by foreign firms. The above results suggest that the FDI reforms did indeed reduce profit 
margins for local firms in the industries which were subject to the reform. However, we do 
not find any evidence that encouraging new multinationals has reduced the profits of the pre­
existing set of multinationals. Hence, there is some evidence that the multinationals and local 
firms have differed in their response to reforms.
The legislations, by allowing FDI through the automatic route, lowered the entry costs 
for multinationals. Given that these were allowed only in high-technology and capital intensive 
industries, they were in industries with high levels of concentration. The entry of multinationals 
increased competition, which reduced profits. There is thus, some evidence to suggest that 
inefficient local firms were earning above normal profits in the previous regime due to protection 
afforded by barriers to entry, in the form of restrictions on entry of multinationals. For the 
pre-existing group of multinationals, the reforms did not affect their profitability. They were 
more efficient than the local firms and could withstand the increased competition from new 
entry.
13Note that MNC profits could be overstated due to transfer pricing issues. However, Indian corporate taxes 
during the period were higher than average US corporate taxes (using the US as a proxy for global taxes). Hence, 
if anything, MNCs had a reason to understate their domestic profits.
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These findings confirm the results from the analysis on persistence of profits in Chap­
ter 3 above. We found that differences in profitability between local and MNCs were being 
driven by differences between the top performing firms in these groups. Specifically, a group of 
high-performing MNCs who existed in the pre-1991 era were persistently outperforming their 
counterparts. The ’firm’ versus ’industry’ hypothesis could claim these to be either due to ef­
ficiency differences or due to strategic mobility barriers between these two groups. The results 
presented above are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that it is efficiency differences which 
are driving the wide disparity in performance.
Two pieces of information are quite relevant - a) Indian industry was booming during this 
time; b) MNC market share was not too high. This seems to suggest that even though there 
was a reduction in profit margins, the multinationals themselves were not in a monopolistic 
position in these industries.
By considering alternative groups of treatment industries we tested whether our results were 
sensitive to the group of treatment industries. If we consider the narrower group of industries 
that actually saw some MNC entry, our basic results are reinforced. However, any construction 
of industries based on ex post realisations (such as actual MNC entry) makes the treatment 
group endogenous and hence not entirely credible. Yet, we present the results for illustration.
Beginning in 1991, there was simultaneous reforms on a number of fronts in Indian industry. 
In this chapter we make claims on the effects of the liberalisation of FDI rules. However, there 
was a concurrent delicencing of many industries which were hitherto governed by strict rules and 
licencing requirements. Our treatment and control groups are unable to distinguish between 
these two reforms, as the control group is constructed on the basis that those industries still 
required licencing. To investigate this further, we split the industries according to licencing 
requirements. That is, into a control group - requiring compulsory licencing, and all other 
industries - where licencing was abolished. For this larger sample, the reforms dummy was 
insignificant, thereby suggesting that the actual impact for the subset of delicenced industries 
we include as treatment was coming from the FDI reforms. There may or may not have been 
an additional impact on profit margins coming from delicencing for these industries.
There is an issue of sample selection bias as the industries open to FDI were all high 
technology and capital intensity. This would be an issue if there axe inherent characteristics of
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these industries which make them more or less profitable than others. There is also the problem 
of endogeneity of MNC entry as they would likely enter industries whose profitability is expected 
to increase. These problems are mitigated by the inclusion of firm fixed effects, which would 
also capture the industry fixed component, as well as the fact that we see profitability evolving 
in different ways for different firms in the industry.
All of the above empirical tests axe based on accounting profits rather than economic profits. 
As Fischer and McGovern (1991) have pointed out, these are different concepts which are similar 
only by chance. To the extent that our results suffer from these measurement errors, our 
hypothesis is restricted to only accounting profit margins, rather than any claims on economic 
profit margins.
We have also imposed a functional form on the profit function based on a very simple 
homogeneous model. More structural estimation would utilise a functional form based on a 
more rigorous model of profitability and competition. Moving to a more involved model based 
on product differentiation remains the objective of future research.
Another limitation of the study is that our measures of market share and concentration 
axe only approximations to the actual market shaxes of firms. To the extent that our data set 
does not include small firms which axe not publicly listed - our market shaxes may be too high. 
Hence, the larger domestic firms, i.e., those which axe listed may be affected differentially from 
smaller ones - which may be operating in niche markets without being affected by MNCs.
4.8 Conclusions
This chapter aimed to test a limited hypothesis. Does the entry of multinationals lead to 
an increase, decrease, or no change in profitability of local firms. Evidence from the Indian 
FDI reforms of 1991 suggests that legislation to allow easier entry for multinationals in Indian 
industry has contributed to increased allocative efficiency as measured by the fall in profit 
margins of local firms. This result is reassuring for the large literature on MNC entry which 
seems to predict similar conclusions. Existing multinationals have not been affected by the 
increased competition. This finding is not inconsistent with the ’firm’ view which states that 
differences in performances axe due to efficiency differences between multinationals and local
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firms in Indian industry.
There are several possible extensions to the analysis presented in this chapter. First, future 
research could try to explain the dynamic mechanisms through which profitability of local firms 
were affected and foreign firms not affected by new multinational entry. Second, what was the 
impact of MNC entry on market structure. Third, what was the impact on productivity of 
local and multinational firms of new MNC entry. These and other related issues would require 
further research.
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Chapter 5
Export Behavior of Indian Firm s
5.1 Introduction
One of the key motivations for the Indian economic reforms starting from 1991 was to improve 
the export performance of Indian firms. As trade and industry have been progressively liber­
alised, there has been a boom in exports. Total exports of goods and factor services went up 
from about 401 billion rupees in 1991 to about 1271 billion rupees in 1997 in absolute terms.1 
Hence, any attempt at analysing and assessing economic performance in the post-reform phase 
must seek to understand the factors which drive exporting behaviour of Indian firms. In this 
chapter, we provide empirical evidence on the export decision by Indian manufacturing firms. 
In a dynamic framework, we consider the impact of sunk costs, individual firm characteristics, 
and spillovers from multinationals and other exporting activity during a period of extraordinary 
export growth.
Chapter 3 above discussed some empirical regularities on export behaviour during the pe­
riod. First, there has been a large increase in export intensity for all manufacturing in the 
post-reform period (Figure 5.1). Second, a preliminary look at the data seems to suggest that 
rather than changes in the concentration of exporting activity among sectors, the distribution 
of export shares across sectors appears to have shifted up during the period (Figure 3.2). In 
this chapter we seek to explain these preliminary patterns by modeling the decision of the firm
1 As a percent of GDP, exports went up from 5.8 to 8.9 percent over the same period. See International 
Finance Statistics, IMF (various years)
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to export. We test whether there are large sunk costs to exporting in Indian industry. We also 
test whether firm characteristics, most notably performance, is an indicator of exporting status. 
There is some debate in the literature on the direction of causality between export behaviour 
and firm performance. Here, we test whether more successful firms tend to export more. A key 
area of debate in the literature on multinationals is whether the presence of MNCs in the same 
industry encourages domestic firms to export more. We test whether there are any industry 
level spillovers from MNCs to local firms.
5.1.1 Related Literature &: Context of Present Study
There have been a number of recent papers which explore the microeconomic aspects of export­
ing success. Bernard and Jensen in a series of papers examine export success at the plant level 
using data on US manufacturing plants. Bernard &; Jensen (1998) show that US exporters have 
faster sales and employment growth than non-exporters in the same industry but do not have 
faster productivity growth. They also find that there are large ex-ante advantages in terms of 
both growth rates and levels for future exporters. Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1996) test for 
the importance of ” learning-by-exporting” on plant productivity in Columbia, Mexico, and Mo­
rocco. They find that exporting does not lower average variable cost relative to non-exporters. 
They also find some evidence that low cost firms are more likely to enter. Bernard and Wagner
(1997) study the relationship between firm success and exporting in German plants and also 
find that larger firms, and firms with higher productivity, are more likely to become exporters 
ex-ante but they do not outperform non-exporters after entry.
The literature on exporting and firm performance has also considered the role of entry costs 
in the export decision. Roberts and Tybout (1997) develop a dynamic model of the export 
decision by a profit-maximising firm and test for the presence and magnitude of sunk costs using 
a sample of Colombian plants. They find that sunk costs are large and are a significant source 
of export persistence. In their sample, prior exporting experience can increase the probability of 
exporting by as much as 60 percentage points. They find that unobserved heterogeneity across 
plants plays a significant role in the probability that a firm exports. They also find that larger, 
older plants that are part of a multi-plant firm are more likely to export. Bernard & Jensen 
(2001) employ a linear probability framework with plant fixed effects and also find substantial
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sunk costs in export entry. Export experience in the previous year increases the probability of 
exporting by 40%, although the entry advantage depreciates very quickly. This chapter extends 
the sunk costs and exporting behaviour literature by providing fresh evidence on the role of 
entry costs in the export decision of firms. Our results are largely consistent with the findings 
of Roberts k, Tybout and Bernard & Jensen (2001).
In a static framework, Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) examine the role of geographic 
and sectoral spillovers on exporting by plants in Mexico. They find that the presence of multi­
national exporters in the same industry and state increases the probability of exporting by 
Mexican firms. They, however, do not find evidence of spillovers from general exporting activ­
ity. This chapter considers both spillovers from the concentration of MNCs in the industry, as 
well as those from general exporting activity in the same industry. In contrast to Aitken et 
al, we find evidence of spillovers from exporting activity in the same industry, but do not find 
any spillovers from MNCs. Our results are however based on spillovers from being in the same 
industry rather than the geographical spillovers that Aitken et al focus on.
The recent work on the export behaviour of firms has emphasized the heterogeneity of 
firm characteristics. Comparing plants at a point in time, Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1997) 
document large, significant differences between exporters and non-exporters among US man­
ufacturing plants. Exporters have more workers, proportionally more white collar workers, 
higher wages, higher productivity, greater capital intensity, higher technology intensity, and are 
more likely to be part of a multi-plant firm. However, these substantial cross-section differences 
between exporters and non-exporters cannot tell us about the direction of causality, i.e., do 
good firms become exporters or do exporters become good firms. Roberts and Tybout (1997) 
include some plant characteristics in their work and find that plant size, plant age, and the 
structure of ownership are positively related to the propensity to export. Aitken, Hanson, and 
Harrison (1997) report evidence that plant size, wages, and especially foreign ownership are 
positively related to the decision to export. This chapter uses a firm-level data set to explore 
the relationship between firm characteristics and exporting. We consider the effect of firm 
performance, firm size, multinationality, age, and capital intensity on the probability to export.
This chapter contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the literature has thus fax 
used plant level data for testing hypotheses even though the firm is the natural unit of analysis,
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particularly for hypotheses related to firm characteristics such as performance and age. By 
using a firm-level data we are able to test these hypotheses directly, and thereby improve upon 
the existing literature.2 Second, we provide fresh evidence on the role of entry costs, firm 
heterogeneity, and industry-level spillovers from exporters and multinationals in the export 
decision of firms. Finally, we are able to isolate the factors which drive exporting behaviour in 
India, and thereby explain the export behaviour of firms in the post reform period.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. The increase in export intensity in Indian 
manufacturing has largely been driven by surviving firms become more export intensive. We 
find evidence of large sunk costs in exporting. Having exported the previous year increases the 
likelihood of exporting by about 36%. Past firm success increases the probability of exporting, 
as does multinationality. Controlling for all other factors, younger firms tend to export more 
than their older counterparts. Finally, we find evidence of spillovers from general exporting 
activity in the same industry but not from the exporting activity of multinationals.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we decompose the 
growth in export intensity to understand what is driving this growth. In Section 3 we present a 
simple model of the export decision. In Section 4 we present the data and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 deals with the empirical methodology to be used. Section 6 presents our results, and 
the following section discusses these results. Finally, section 8 concludes.
5.2 Decom posing Export Growth
To understand what has happened to exports in Indian industry, we look at the evolution of 
export intensity in the period 1989-1997. Aggregating across firms, overall export intensity X  
is defined as:
X  =  J 2 ^ f x ( j )  (5-1)
j
where Z (j)  is sales of firm j ,  and Z  is total sales. Figure 5.1 plots the evolution of export 
intensity over the sample period and clearly shows that there has been a trend break in the
2To the extent that some plants in a multi-plant firm serve only the domestic market, whereas others are 
entirely export oriented, our aggregation to the firm level will not be able to distinguish them.
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post reform period. Whereas firms in Indian industry were exporting about 6% of their net 
sales in 1991, that number has doubled to 12% of sales by 1997. This pattern is quite robust 
across industries.
We would like to decompose this export-intensity to get a better understanding of the reasons 
for this increase. There axe four potential contributors to the increase in export-intensity. First, 
is it due to entering firms being more export intensive. Second, is it the case that less export­
intensive firms have exited in the sample period, thereby raising overall intensity. Third, is it 
due to a reallocation of output to the most export-intensive firms. Fourth, can we explain the 
increase due to an increase in the average export-intensity of surviving firms.
We follow the decomposition procedure of Bailey, Hulten, Campbell (1992)3 and decompose 
aggregate export intensity growth into the contributions of entering firms (n), exiting firms 
(re), reallocation among surviving incumbents (s), and export intensity gains for surviving 
incumbents. Denoting the set of firms of each type aswfe, k =  n ,x ,s  :
x ' ~ x  =  Y ( Xn~X’) ~ Y lXx~Xa) ( 5 ' 2 )
( ^  - f 1) £ f 1 (*'«> - *«>)
The first term represents the export intensity contribution from entrants whose intensity 
levels differ on average from that of surviving incumbents. The second term represents the cor­
responding export contribution from firm exit. The third is the contribution from reallocation 
across incumbent survivors. The fourth is the contribution of export intensity changes within 
the incumbent survivors.
Table 5.1 shows the results from the export intensity decomposition.4 Observe that most of 
the change has come from the last row - export intensity changes within incumbent survivors. 
Hence, in the period 1989-1997, the increase in export intensity in Indian industry is largely 
driven by incumbent firms getting more export intensive. We discuss this finding in Section 7
3 The authors cited here use the procedure for decomposing aggregate productivity growth for firms into its 
constituent elements.
4 We perform the decomposition for the change between 1990-1996. This is representative of the export 
intensity changes in the period. Using different years produced almost identical results.
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below.
5.3 The M odel
The theoretical literature on the decision to export is developed in papers by Dixit (1989), 
Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Krugman (1989). Here, we follow Roberts 
and Tybout (1997) and especially Bernard and Jensen (2001) in modelling the decision to export 
by the rational, profit maximising firm as analogous to the decision to market a new product.
The firm considers expected profits today and in the future from the decision to enter the 
foreign market net of any fixed costs. If the firm enters the foreign market, we assume that it 
can always produce at the profit-maximizing level of exports, q*t . Thus, in the one period case 
with no entry costs, the firm receives profits:
*&it) =  PtQit ^itl^if) (5-3)
where pt is the price of goods sold abroad and ca{.) is the variable cost of producing quantity 
q*t . Exogenous factors affecting profitability, such as exchange rates, are denoted as f2*, while 
firm-specific factors are denoted by Firm characteristics that might increase the probability 
of exporting include size, profitability, capital intensity, ownership structure.
The export status of firm i in period t  is given by Yu, where
Yit =  1 if 'Kn >  0
Yu =  0 if 7tu < 0
This single period model can be extended to multiple periods. When there are no entry 
costs, the expected profits of the firm in multiple periods is given by:
n «(n t) $«) =  E t ^  6*-1 \psQis -  *<,!<&)]) (5.4)
As long as the cost function does not depend on the level of output in a previous period,
the solution of this multi-period problem is identical to the single period case. If there is any
96
effect of production today on costs tomorrow, then export status of the firm today will play a 
role in the decision to export tomorrow.
cn =  Cit (Qt , $ it , qlMit-1) and ^  0
This might occur if there is learning by doing in production of the export good. The value 
function for the problem is given by:
Vu (.) =  max (irit * Yit +  SEt [V;t+i (.) |g?(])
{««}
and a firm will choose to export in period t, i.e. Yu =  1 if
*it +  SEt [Vfc+i (.) |qtt] >  SEt [Vit+1 (.) =  0]
Entering foreign markets, however, have entry costs. These costs could be acquiring infor­
mation about the foreign market, obtaining credit, establishing a distribution system, meeting 
foreign government regulations. Here we assume that these entry costs recur in full if the firm 
exits the export market for any amount of time.
Profits for the firm in single period maximisation problem with entry costs are given by:
7rit(Qt , $ iu Y it-1) =  Ptqtt -  Citi^t, $ it, q*t\qit-1) - N ( l -  Y it-1) (5.5)
where N  is the entry cost for the firm. The firm does not have to pay the entry cost if it 
exported in the previous period, i.e., if Yu-1 =  1. Firms will export if expected profits net of 
entry costs are positive: Yu-\ =  1 if ttu >  0
This formulation of entry costs as sunk costs yields an option value to waiting and thus 
increases the region where the firm chooses not to act. The firm chooses a sequence of output 
levels, {q*s}^Lt , that maximizes current and discounted future profits,
n  u =  Et
where period-by-period profits are given by equation (5.5) above, and are constrained to be
s—t
(5.6)
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non-negative since the firm always has the option not to export. This is equivalent to the firm 
choosing whether to export in each period since we allow the firm to always pick the within 
period profit maximising quantity. The value function is the same as before with the addition 
of potential entry costs in the within period profits,
Vit (.) =  max {Hit * [g*( > 0] +  SEt [VJt+i (.) |g*,])
k J
A firm will choose to export in period t , i.e. q*t >  0, if
ptqrt +  S(Et [V«+I (.) |<fi > 0] -  Et [Vu+1 (.) |<fi =  0]) > C i t  +  Nit( 1 -  (5.7)
The difference in the multi-period models with and without entry costs comes through 
the added intertemporal link between exporting today and exporting tomorrow embodied in 
the cost of entry. However, without a structural model of the production function, and cost 
function, we will be unable to identify intertemporal spillovers due to learning and those due 
to sunk costs.
Now, we may estimate the export decision in two ways. First, we could develop a structural 
representation of the participation condition by making specific assumptions about the form 
of the cost function. Alternatively, we could forgo identification of structural parameters and 
approximate the export decision as a reduced form expression in exogenous firm and market 
characteristics that are observable in period t. The advantage of the first approach is that, in 
principle, it allows identification of the parameters of the cost function and provides a complete 
description of the dynamic process. Its main disadvantage is that very restrictive parameterisa- 
tions are required to make structural estimation feasible.5 Because of this difficulty, we employ 
a non-structural model in testing hypotheses about the role of firm characteristics, spillovers, 
sunk costs, and period of entry in the decision to export by the firm.
Before discussing our empirical methodology we turn to describing the data.
5 See R&T (1997) for more on the above.
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5.4 D ata and Descriptives
We use the Indian firm-level dataset described in chapter 3 . We have information on total 
amount of exports, net sales, profits, gross fixed assets, ownership, and year of incorporation 
for each of the manufacturing firms. Table 5.2 shows the representativeness of the sample. The 
total number of firms in the sample increased from 1989-1995 before falling, due to exit, in the 
last two sample years 1996-97. The percentage of firms exporting is a little over a half of all 
firms. This percentage is perhaps greater than the percentage of exporting firms in the entire 
economy, because the sample comprises mostly publicly listed firms which tend to be larger, 
and more open than unlisted firms. Further, all unregistered firms are not included in the 
sample. Somewhat surprisingly, given the economic reforms, the percentage of firms exporting 
does not change much over the sample period. There is a gradual increase from 51.5% to 55% 
in the first 8 years and then a jump to 58% in 1997. Among multinationals, the percentage 
which export is greater at around 70%. Moreover, there has been a pronounced increase in the 
percentage of MNCs exporting from 62% at the start of the period to 76% at the end.
Table 5.2 also shows the incidence of long run export persistence in Indian industry. The 
last row shows the percentage of firms that exported in 1989 and continue to export in later 
years. We find that almost three-fourths of firms that exported in 1989 continue to export in 
1997. These numbers are remarkably similar to those obtained by Bernard Sz Jensen (2001) for 
US plants. They find that 78% of plants that exported in 1984 continue to do so 8 years later.
Table 5.3 lists firm characteristics of exporters and non-exporters. We pick two years 1990 
and 1996 as representative of the pre-reform and post-reform period. The table shows that 
both in terms of sales and fixed assets, exporters are much bigger than their non-exporting 
counterparts. In fact, in terms of sales, exporters are almost five times as large as non-exporters.
With these preliminary patterns in the data in mind, we turn to the more formal analysis.
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5.5 Empirical M ethodology
From the multi-period model with entry costs, we find that a firm exports if current and 
expected revenues are greater than costs,6
Y  _  J 1 * / *it >  °it +  N (1  -
1 1 0 otherwise j
where
5?« =  pt<gt +  S(Et [V« +1 (.) |<& >  0] -  Et [Vit+i (.) |5*( =  0])
We aim to identify and quantify factors that increase the probability of exporting. We 
estimate these effects using a binary choice non-structural approach of the form
v  _  f 1 i f  (3®it-1 +  7 ^ - 1  — N (  1 — Yu-1) +  £it >  0 ■ ( .
lt 1 0 otherwise ''}
5.5.1 Sunk Costs
The most difficult issue in the estimation of equation (5.8) above is the identification of the 
parameter on the lagged endogenous variable. There are unobserved firm characteristics, such 
as managerial ability or corporate strategy which affect the decision to export by the firm. Since 
these characteristics are highly serially correlated and unobserved, they will induce persistence 
in export behaviour. This will cause us to overestimate entry costs. This means that the 
error term, £u, can be thought of as comprising two components, a permanent firm-specific 
component, //*, and a transitory component, rja, which captures other, exogenous shocks.
For the dynamic binary choice model with unobserved heterogeneity, there axe several poten­
tial estimation strategies. Roberts & Tybout (1997) use a random effects probit specification in 
their analysis of sunk costs and entry. To use a random effects model, the required assumption 
is that firm effects be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. This assumption is likely to 
be violated in our export decision model as firm characteristics such as size, profitability, and
6Here we assume that fixed costs of entering the export market, such as fufilling export requirements, foreign 
government regulations, installing distribution channels etc, are the same for all firms.
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ownership are correlated with unobserved firm effects such as managerial expertise.
An alternative strategy is to use the fixed effects model. The Within transformation wipes 
out time invariant firm effects, but the lagged dependent variable is still correlated with the 
error term. The coefficient on the lagged dependent variable will be biased and inconsistent, 
unless the number of time periods is very large.7
A transformation that wipes out the individual effects, yet does not create the above prob­
lem, is the first difference (FD) transformation.8 This instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
method leads to consistent but not necessarily efficient estimates of the parameters in the model 
because it does not make use of all the available moment conditions.9 A more efficient proce­
dure to estimate dynamic panel data models is the Arellano and Bond procedure which is a 
GMM estimator. The procedure obtains additional instruments by utilising the orthogonality 
conditions that exist between lagged values of the dependent variable and the disturbances. 
Thus, more instruments can be used as the panel progresses yielding efficiency gains relative to 
other estimation methods.10 Here we use the Arellano and Bond procedure.11
The equation to be estimated is:
Yu =  1 +  7 ^ - 1  +  OYu-1 +  £u (5-9)
First we estimate eqn (5.9) in levels without firm effects. This enables us to observe the 
effects of time-invariant firm attributes on export probabilities. The levels estimation also gives 
an upper bound on the importance of sunk costs. Now, firms that change from exporting to 
non-exporting and vice versa may undergo contemporaneous changes in size, performance, and 
capital intensity. Hence we lag all firm characteristics and exogenous variables one year to
7See Nickell (1981), and Ridder and Wansbeek (1990) for a derivation of this asymptotic bias. Kiviet (1995) 
also shows that for the typical panel where N is large and T is fixed, the Within estimator is biased and 
inconsistent.
8Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest first differencing the model to get rid of the individual firm effects and 
then using A y i , t - 2  =  ( y i , t - 2  — V i , t -3) as an instrument for A y i tt - i  =  (j/i,t - i  — 2)- These instruments will
not be correlated with Arju — r)u — rju-i, as long as the r}it themselves are not serially correlated.
9See Baltagi (1995) for a discussion of the above. Also see Ahn and Schmidt (1993). The IV estimation 
method also does not take into account the differenced structure on the residual disturbances A/z»t. Arellano 
(1989) finds that the differences rather than the levels have very large variances over a range of parameter values.
10See Arellano and Bond (1991) for details.
11 We also applied the FD-IV estimation strategy which was used by Bernard and Jensen (2001). The results 
were very similar to the Arellano and Bond method, and hence are not reported here.
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alleviate simultaneity problems.
We then consider the role of firm fixed effects:
Yu — 1 4- +  QYit-1 4- fa 4- rjit (5.10)
We estimate eqn (5.10) in levels with fixed effects. As discussed earlier, the estimates are 
biased downwards and inconsistent but give us a lower bound for the importance of the lagged 
endogenous variable.
Finally, we estimate (5.10) in differences with instrumental variables using the Arellano- 
Bond method.
A Yu =  4- +  0A Yit-i 4- Arjn (5*11)
This formulation also allows us to control for persistent shocks. If shocks are highly per­
sistent, they can overcome the effects of large entry costs. Unmodelled persistence in the error 
structure would be picked up by the lagged endogenous variable and thus incorrectly interpreted 
as high entry costs. The first-differences specification should help alleviate this problem as well, 
although there is a loss in efficiency if the shocks axe purely transitory.
5.5.2 Spillovers
There is a large body of anecdotal evidence which suggests that the presence of export-oriented 
MNCs can lead to spillovers whereby local firms start exporting more. One much documented 
case is that of the development of garment exporters in Bangladesh. The entry of one Korean 
garment exporter in Bangladesh lead to the establishment of hundreds of exporting enterprises, 
all owned by local entrepreneurs. Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) find evidence of localised 
spillovers from the export activity of multinationals in Mexico.
In this chapter we test two versions of the export-spillover hypothesis. We test whether the 
presence of multinationals in the same industry generates spillovers, i.e., whether MNCs act 
as export catalysts; and whether all export activity in the same industry generates spillovers. 
The potential for spillovers from MNCs derives from the fact that MNCs have a multi-market 
presence. They have a greater access than local firms to international market information,
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distribution channels, and international marketing skills. Thus, MNCs can be a conduit for 
information about foreign markets, and can provide channels through which domestic firms can 
distribute and market their goods. We use various measures to test for MNC spillovers. First, 
we test whether a large MNC market share in the industry increases the likelihood of exporting. 
Second, we consider the export share of MNCs in total exports of the industry as an indicator 
of MNC presence in exporting activity. Third, we create a dummy for those industries which 
have actually had MNC entry in the 1990s. This indicator captures those industries where 
recent multinational activity has taken place and see if this activity has had an impact on the 
probability to export. Fourth, we look at the sheer number of MNCs in the industry that 
export.
We also test whether the concentration of general exporting activity in the industry can 
increase the probability that firms will export. This could come about through demonstration 
effects within the industry of the informational, distributional, and marketing channels of ex­
porters in the industry. The variables we consider to capture spillovers from overall exporting 
activity are - a) the export intensity of the industry, and b) the number of exporters in the 
industry.
5.5.3 Firm Characteristics
We seek to understand what firm characteristics axe important in explaining export behaviour. 
We test several hypotheses related to firm characteristics and the export decision. First, we 
consider those firm attributes that are related to past success. We follow Bernard & Jensen
(1998) who show that good firms become exporters. The measures of firm success we use axe 
firm size and firm profitability. Larger firms are naturally those which have been successful in 
the past and hence grown in size. Larger firms may also have lower average, or marginal, costs 
providing a separate mechanism for size to increase the likelihood of exporting. Further, our 
firm level data allows us to use profitability as a direct measure of past success, and thus adds 
to the existing literature. We use two measures of profitability, profits over assets, and profits 
over sales.
Since the direction of causality between firm characteristics and export behaviour is uncer­
tain, we lag all firm characteristics one period to alleviate simultaneity problems.
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There is a large body of research on the role of multinationals in trade. MNCs are generally 
considered as likely to be more open than local firms due to their presence in multiple countries 
and hence easier access to and knowledge about, foreign markets. In our data, we consistently 
find MNCs, on average, and over all time periods are more likely to export than local firms. 
Hence we include a dummy for multinationality.
Finally, we consider the role of age in exporting behaviour. The relation between age and 
exporting behaviour is not unambiguous. Older firms may have gathered more information, and 
developed the appropriate distribution and marketing channels to make the cost of entry into 
foreign markets lower. This would indicate that older firms are more likely to export. However, 
younger firms might be more flexible in their export behaviour and can more easily move into 
export markets. Hence, we attempt to distinguish between these alternate hypotheses linking a 
firm’s age to exporting behaviour. To determine whether being born in the post-reform phase 
makes a firm more open we also use a dummy for a firm that is bom after 1991 to indicate a 
firm bom in the post-reform era.
5.6 Basic Results
Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7 shows the results from our basic estimation equations. The depen­
dent variable in tables 5.4, 5.6 and 5.7 is Y  and is a binary variable which takes on a value of 
1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise. In table 5.5, the dependent variable is export intensity 
as measured by the ratio of exports over sales. Table 5.4 shows the results from the levels - 
OLS estimation without any firm effects. This specification is especially useful in determining 
the effects of time-invariant firm characteristics on exporting behaviour. The first row shows 
that the lagged dependent variable is highly significant in all specifications. The levels regres­
sion co-efficient of 0.76 is probably an overestimation for the reasons discussed in section 5. 
We also find that the co-efficient on having exported two years ago is significant in all three 
specifications.
Turning to the firm characteristics, we find that the sales variable has a positive and sig­
nificant co-efficient and so do both the profitability measures - profits over assets and profit 
margins over sales. This indicates that more successful firms tend to be exporters. Also, as
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predicted in the descriptives section, multinationality increases the likelihood that the firm will 
export.
The next set of variables test the spillovers hypothesis. We find that all the variables testing 
for spillovers from MNCs are insignificant. The MNC market share in the industry as well as 
the number of MNC exporters are both insignificant. The MNC export share in the industry is 
negative and significant at the 5% level in specification (1), but insignificant when we control 
for industry effects.
On the other hand, all the variables testing for general spillovers from exporting in the same 
industry are significant. The export intensity in the industry variable is positive and significant 
suggesting that the larger the concentration of exports in an industry, the more likely it is that 
a firm in the industry will export. The number of exporters in the industry variable is also 
positive and significant.
The variable testing for age effects is whether a firm is born in the 1990s. We find that this 
variable is positive and significant at the 5% level. The reforms dummy is also highly significant 
and suggests that even after controlling for other determinants of export behaviour, there is an 
impetus to exporting in the reforms period.
Finally, the year dummies capture all the time specific effects that reflect macro-level changes 
in export conditions such as exchange rates, credit-market conditions, trade-policy conditions 
and all other year specific effects that are common to all firms.
To understand the effects of firm characteristics and spillovers we used export information 
on firms by using export intensity as a dependent variable rather than the simple binary choice 
variable. The results are shown in table 5.5. Our basic results discussed above are little changed. 
Export intensity in the previous year explains almost 50% of export intensity in the given year. 
Firm characteristics such as sales and profitability are positive and significant as expected. Once 
we control for the degree of export orientedness, multinationality becomes insignificant. This 
seems to suggest that although multinational firms are more likely to export, they do not seem 
to export a larger proportion of their sales than local firms. Export intensity in the industry is 
significant while multinational export share is not. When we control for export intensity two 
years ago, most of the variables become insignificant. This can be explained by the fact that the 
export intensity variable lagged two periods will absorb any variation caused by the industry
105
level variables. Hence, the industry level variables become insignificant.
Table 5.6 reports the results of the fixed effects and Arellano and Bond regression. The 
lagged dependent variable is highly significant in both the estimations. The fixed effects co­
efficient of 0.23 is biased downwards - for all the reasons discussed earlier. The Arellano-Bond 
estimate of 0.34 is our likely estimate of the effect of sunk costs on exporting. Thus, having 
exported the year before increases the likelihood of exporting by 34%.
Firm characteristics are not significant in any of the specifications as controlling for firm 
fixed effects absorbs much of their effects. This suggests that the identification was coming 
from cross-section variance rather than variation over time. Again, none of the MNC spillover 
variables are significant. We find that the export intensity in the industry is significant in the 
fixed effects regression but not in the Arellano-Bond specification. This can be explained by 
thinking of export intensity in the industry being a level effect and which is no longer significant 
in the differences specification. The age and the reforms dummy are highly significant in the FD- 
IV version confirming our earlier results from the OLS estimation. Note that the fixed effects 
regression drops ail the time invariant variables such as multinationality, age, and reforms 
dummy.
Finally, Table 5.7 presents comparisons of the alternate strategies - Random Effects Probit 
analysis with the A-B estimation. We see that the lagged dependent variable in the probit 
specification is unusually large and for the reasons discussed in section 5 above cannot be 
adequately interpreted. All the rest of the variables have the expected sign and significance as 
the OLS regressions. Note that the MNC spillover variables are all insignificant.
5.7 Discussion
As mentioned in previous chapters, the period covered by the data witnessed significant macro, 
industrial as well as trade reforms in the Indian economy. The exchange rate was devalued 
starting from 1991 and the system transformed in less than two years from a discretionary 
basket pegged system to a market-determined, unified exchange rate. The heavy anti-export 
bias in the trade and payments regime was also reduced substantially by a phased reduction in 
the exceptionally high customs tariffs and a phased elimination of quantitative restrictions on
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imports. Ideally, we would like to have data on the differential tariff changes by industry, to 
consider the impact of these on firm exporting behaviour. Since we have year dummies in all 
the specifications, we are able to control, to some extent, for macroeconomic factors affecting 
the economy as well as the overall annual changes in trade policy.
The result that there are large sunk costs to exporting squares well with the finding of the 
decomposition of export growth in section 2 above. Since there are sunk costs to exporting, 
surviving firms have been better able to take advantage of trade reforms and the general im­
provement in exporting conditions. The result that better performers tend to export more, also 
reconciles with the notion that survivors are more likely to be better performers than firms that 
exit. Hence, they have driven the increase in exporting activity.
The result that there are lack of positive spillovers from MNCs ties in well with the earlier 
finding (Chapter 3), that most of MNC activity is of the horizontal type, and aimed for the 
domestic market. Since the MNCs are not focusing on exports, the demonstration effects for 
local firms in the same industry are correspondingly small. Hence, local firms do not show any 
increased propensity to export simply due to larger MNC presence in their industry. Second, 
as we showed in Chapter 4 above, MNC presence has had a negative impact on domestic firm 
performance. This would affect exporting activity of local firms due to the direct effect of poorer 
performance on exports, as well as due to a negative market share effect. The spillovers from 
general exporting activity can be attributed to the demonstration effects mentioned above on 
other domestic firms in the same industry.
There are several caveats to these results. First, there could be sample selection problems 
as the data doesn’t contain small, unregistered firms. This would be a problem for our main 
results only if the number of exporters and the export intensity amongst these firms differed 
significantly from both the larger sample as well as from earlier time periods. In particular, there 
may be new small export-oriented firms entering, which are more likely to export than older 
firms which are not captured by the data. However, the results from the export decomposition 
are so stark so as to render that claim as untenable. Second, we do not test for geographical 
spillovers which constrains the comparability of our results with earlier work on spillovers.
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5.8 Conclusions
Even though Indian industrial exports still account for less than 1% of total world exports, 
the last decade has seen a substantial increase in exporting activity leading to a near doubling 
of the exports to GDP ratio. This chapter has tried to analyse the microeconomics of the 
export performance of Indian firms. We find that most of the increase in export intensity in the 
reform period has been driven by existing firms becoming more export-oriented. This finding is 
contrary to the notion that the opening up of industry through reforms led to large scale entry 
of more export-oriented firms who then drove the overall export performance.
Using a dynamic framework and the empirical estimation methodology of Bernard & Jensen 
(2001), we investigate the determinants of export behaviour in Indian industry. We find that 
there are substantial sunk costs to exporting. The results show that exporting the previous 
year increases the likelihood of exporting by 36%. These figures almost mimic those of Bernard 
&; Jensen and are somewhat less than that of 60% found by Roberts &; Tybout.
Firm characteristics play an important role in determining export behaviour. Past success 
increases the likelihood of exporting. Thus, we find that larger, and more profitable firms 
are more likely to export. Further, multinationality provides an impetus to exporting. These 
results are consistent with the literature on firm performance and exporting behaviour.
We test for industry-level spillovers from other exporters as well as multinationals and 
MNC exporters. We find that the presence of other exporters in the industry increases the 
likelihood that a firm will export. However, there is no evidence to suggest that MNCs act as 
export catalysts. These findings are contrary to those of Aitken et al (1997) who find positive 
geographical spillovers from MNCs but not from general exporting activity. The results are 
also at odds with Bernard & Jensen who also fail to find evidence of industry level spillovers 
from exporting activity. This suggests that there may be a dichotomy between geographical 
and industry level spillovers and therefore more research is needed.
Finally, we test for the role of age in exporting behaviour, and find that younger firms tend 
to export more than older firms. This contradicts the evidence from Columbia reported by 
Roberts h  Tybout, and could perhaps be explained by the fact that younger Indian firms have 
lower costs of switching in and out of the export market than older firms.
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Appendix A
Equilibrium:
From upstream industry demand and price index (equations (2.11)& (2.13))
nziXi =  q l 
From FOC for upstream firms (eqn(2.18))
Zi (  1 - - ) =  &
7
From the 7r =  0 condition:
Xi =  (7 -  1) Fi 
We choose units for output such that:
F4 =  l / ( 7 - l )
Thus, equilibrium firm scale:
x*{ = l
Setting Zi =  1 :
—  I  
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From equation (2.11)
q 7 =  D ibifii +  D2b2 ^ 2  (A.7)
Substituting in the Demand functions:
<r7 =
Substituting in eqns (2.16), (2.17) for prices:
<r7 =  ( 3 ^ (C 2 - c i) +  ^  + g ) - M s ) & i + ( M s - ^ (c2 - c 1) - ^ (3 +  ©)iW*2 (A.9) 
Now,
C2 -  C l =  &2/^2 ( 9  ~  r )  +  &2r  ~  M
and,
As = a(l — /if)
Thus, in terms of exogenous parameters, we have an equation relating q and /if :
=  {  3 a ( i - ^ )  ( ^ 2  [9 ~  r l +  b2r ~  bio)  +  § ( 0  +  ®  -  ^ a ( 1  “  ^ 2 ) }  & i +
j&z(l -  /if) -  [&2^2 (9 -  r ) +  b2T -  hq] -  — i ®  }  b2 ^ 2
The second equation relating q and /if is given by FOC of MNC making a quality choice 
(eqn(2.20))
d,7T2 ,  dp2 dc2 x „  . /  x dD2 /  a 1 an
d/if d/if d/if 2 P2 C2 d/if
These 2 equations can be solved simultaneously to get equilibrium <7* and /if 
Suppressing the relation between ci,C2, As and equilibrium q* and /if, we can write equi­
librium demands and profits for downstream firms as:
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^  =  ^ - C i ) + ¥ ~ n )
*1 = 9 ^ ( c 2 - c i ) 2 + ^(c2 - c 1)(0-2g) + ^(0-2fi)2As 
A = 9 ^ ( c i - c 2)2 + | ( c i - c 2)(25-fi) + i(25 -e )2As
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Appendix B
Linkage Effect:
From equilibrium - the following relation holds betwen q and A s :
c f 1 — 1 3 2 5  {^2 ^ 2  [q ~  r] +  b2r ~ biq'j +  |( 0  +  0) — 0As j  6 i +  
{^A s _  M i [h v i  { q ~ r )  +  b2r -  biq] -  ^ ( 0  +  0 )}  62M2
Taking total differentials, we can show:
B .l  P roof of Proposition 1:
M a x ^ d  7T2 =  (P2 -  C2) D 2 ip \-P 2 ) -  G  
s.t. i4 > t 4
The Lagrangian is:
L =  (jp2 -  c2)D 2 (pi-P2) ~ G +  \{P 2 ~  t4 )  
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FOC:
dL ( dp2 dc2\ r  ^ , xdD2
dp i  (
Constraint on the multiplier:
dp i  ^dpi  d p i )D2 + iP2 °2) dp i  +  A
A > 0
Complementary Slackness:
P2 ~ P$) — 0
Now,
d£>2 _  a <iZ>2 dp2 _  ^ dp2 dc2 _   ^dc2
dp i dA s  ’ dp i dAs ’ dp i dAs
From complementary slackness:
I f  A > 0 then p i  =  p i
From FOC:
dp2 dc2 x ^  . , s. dD2
A =  a(— ------------------ +  CL{P2 -  C2 ) t t ~KdA s d A sJ ^  ' dAs
For A > 0 : from FOC, we want
dp2 ^ dc2 , dD 2 ~rz— > -77— and — — > 0 
dAs dAs dAs
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So combining the above two inequalities, condition for A >  0 is:
|  (23 -  e) >  | (r -  , )  _  -  hf4) > o
B.2 P roof of Lemma 1:
From equilibrium equations (2.16) and (2.17), we have:
&  =  +  2b^ ] +  i ( 5 - 2 ©  +  ^ ( r - 9)
where the first term on the RHS is the linkage effect, and the last term is the cost decrease 
of the multinational when it buys local instead of foreign inputs.
But,
And by assumption:
— (r — q) >  0 
a
Hence,
B .3 Proof of Lemma 2:
Let, k =  p2 -  pi
Hence,
k = \ ( c 2 - Cl) +  ^ ( 5  +  ©
dk _  1 dq +  (r _  g) +  | ( 0  +  0)
dAs 3 dAs —  3 a 3
>  0 z /  t t - ( 62M2 -  M i )  +  — O' -  9) +  (0 +  0) >  0dAs dAs —
J
N ow , - jr—{b2kb2 ~ bi^i) >  0 shown above and by assumption  dA s  —
b2
— (r — g) > 0 by assumption  
a
(0  +  0 ) >  0 by assumption
B .4 Proof o f Proposition 3:
From the utilities of the 2 sub-groups in the population:
U\ =  -  y j  si -  Pi ( 0 - £ )  and U2 =  ^ y  -  y j  s2 - P 2  -  #)
Thus, we can show that C S  changes with a DCR in the following way:
dCS _  dk_ ^  _  1 2 _ d p i _
dAs dAs  V / 2 \ A s y  dAs 2
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dCS
dAs
< 0 i f
dAs - )A s )
B.5 Simulations:
The following parameter values were used for the simulations: 
a =  0.5 
6 =  2 
9 =  1 
r =  1.2 
bi = t >2 =  2  
(3 = 1  
F =  1 
7 =  2 
x =  1
dpi 62
dAs  ^  2
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Figure 2.1: Linkage Effects - Input Price Index
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Figure 2.2: Local Firm Profits
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Figure 2.3: Consumer Surplus & Content Requirements
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Table 3.1: Sectoral Distribution of FDI Stock in India, 1980-97
Industry Group FDI Stock - March 1980 FDI Stock - March 1990 Approvals 1991-97
Value % Value % Value %
(Million
rupees)
(Million rupees) (Million rupees)
1. Plantations & Horticulture 385 4.1 2,560 9.5 4,901 0.33
II. Mining 78 0.8 80 0.3 15,576 1.06
III. Petroleum & Power 368 3.9 30 0.1 423,905 28.91
IV. Manufacturing 8,116 86.9 22,980 84.9 545,135 37.18
Food & Beverages 391 4.2 1,620 6 75,748 5.17
Textiles 320 3.4 920 3.4 23,700 1.62
Machinery & Machine Tools 710 7.6 3,540 13.1 32,830 2.24
Transport Equipment 515 5.5 2,820 10.4 71,082 4.84
Metal & Metal Products 1,187 12.7 1,410 5.2 73,225 6.00
Electrical & electronics 975 10.4 2,950 10.9 79,702 5.44
Chemicals & allied products 3,018 32.3 7,690 28.4 100,759 6.88
Misc. manufacturing 1,000 10.7 2,030 7.5 88,089 6.01
V. Services 385 4.1 1,400 5.2 459,086 31.30
Telecommunications n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 296,271 20.21
Finance & Banking n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 63,012 4.30
Hotels & Tourism n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 29,720 2.03
Air and sea transport n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 19,954 1.36
Consultancy n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 10,068 0.69
Other services n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 40,061 2.73
Total 9,332 100.0 27,050 100 1,466,218 100
Source: SIA Newsletter, Dept, of Industrial Policy & Promotion, December, 1997
Table 3.2: FDI in India - Approvals vs Actual Inflows (US $million)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Approvals 325 1781 3559 4332 11245 11142 15752
Actual Inflow 155 233 574 959 2100 2340 3330
Realisation Rate 48% 13% 16% 22% 19% 21% 21%
Source: Economic Survey, 1999
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Table 3.3: Classification of Industrial Groups and FDI Approvals (%) - 1991-97
Technology FDI % Wages FDI %
High Technology High Wage
Drugs & Medicines (pharmaceuticals) 0.7 Chemicals excluding drugs 9.5
Office & Computing equipment 0.7 Drugs & Medicines (pharmaceuticals) 0.7
Electrical machinery (exd. comm. Equipment) 8.3 Petroleum refineries & products 12.5
Radio, TV, and communication equipment 31.0 Office & Computing equipment 0.7
Aircraft 0.0 Motor vehicles 4.4
Professional Goods 0.4 Aircraft 0.0
Total 41.2 TOTAL 27.9
Medium Technology Medium Wage
Chemicals excluding drugs 9.5 Paper, paper products & printing 2.2
Rubber & Plastic Products 0.5 Rubber & Plastic Products 0.5
Non-ferrous metals 0.8 Non-metallic mineral products 1.3
Non-electrical machinery 3.4 lion & Steel 5.6
Other transport equipment 5.1 Non-ferrous metals 0.8
Motor vehicles 4.4 Fabricated metal products 1.2
Other manufacturing 1.5 Non-electrical machinery 3.4
Total 25.4 Radio, TV, and communication equipment 31.0
Low Technology Shipbuilding & Repairing 0.0
Food, beverages & Tobacco 7.9 Professional Goods 0.4
Textiles, apparel & leather 2.7 TOTAL 46.4
Wood products & printing 0.0 Low Wage
Paper, paper products & printing 2.2 Food, beverages & Tobacco 7.9
Petroleum refineries & products 12.5 Textiles, apparel & leather 2.7
Non-metallic mineral products 1.3 Wood products & printing 0.0
Iron & Steel 5.6 Electrical machinery (exd. comm. Equip.) 8.3
Fabricated metal products 1.2 Other transport equipment 5.1
Shipbuilding & Repairing 0.0 Other manufacturing 1.5
Total 33.5 TOTAL 25.6
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Table 3.3 cont: Classification of Industrial Groups and FDI Approvals (%) - 1991-
97
Orientation FDI % Market Structure FDI %
Resource Intensive Homogeneous fragmented
Food, beverages & Tobacco 7.9 Textiles, apparel & leather 2.7
Wood products & printing 0.0 Wood products & printing 0.0
Petroleum refineries & products 12.5 Non-metallic mineral products 1.3
Non-metallic mineral products 1.3 Other manufacturing 1.5
Non-ferrous metals 0.8 TOTAL 5.5
TOTAL 22.5 Homogeneous segmented
Labour Intensive Paper, paper products & printing 2.2
Textiles, apparel & leather 2.7 Petroleum refineries & products 12.5
Fabricated metal products 1.2 Rubber & Plastic Products 0.5
Other manufacturing 1.5 Iron & Steel 5.6
TOTAL 5.4 Non-ferrous metals 0.8
Scale Intensive Shipbuilding & Repairing 0.0
Paper, paper products & printing 2.2 TOTAL 21.7
Chemicals excluding drugs 9.5 Differentiated fragmented
Rubber & Plastic Products 0.5 Fabricated metal products 1.2
Iron & Steel 5.6 Non-electrical machinery 3.4
Other transport equipment 5.1 Office & Computing equipment 0.7
Motor vehicles 4.4 Electrical machinery (exd. comm. Equip.) 8.3
Shipbuilding & Repairing 0.0 Radio, TV, and communication equipment 31.0
t 6 ta l 38.3 Professional Goods 0.4
Specialised Supplier TOTAL 45.1
Non-electrical machinery 3.4 Differentiated segmented
Electrical machinery (exd. comm. Equip.) 8.3 Food, beverages & Tobacco 7.9
Radio, TV, and communication equipment 31.0 Chemicals excluding drugs 9.5
TOTAL 42.7 Drugs & Medicines (pharmaceuticals) 0.7
Science Based Motor vehides 4.4
Drugs & Medicines (pharmaceuticals) 0.7 Aircraft 0.0
Office & Computing equipment 0.7 Other transport equipment 5.1
Aircraft 0.0 TOTAL 27.7
Professional Goods 0.4
TOTAL 1.9
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Table 3.3 cont: Classification of Industrial Groups and FDI Approvals (%) - 1991-
97
Skills FDI %
Skilled
Food, beverages & Tobacco 7.9
Paper, paper products & printing 2.2
Chemicals excluding drugs 9.5
Drugs & Medicines (pharmaceuticals) 0.7
Petroleum refineries & products 12.5
Fabricated metal products 1.2
Office & Computing equipment 0.7
Radio, TV, and communication equipment 31.0
Aircraft 0.0
Professional Goods 0.4
TOTAL 66.3
Unskilled
Textiles, apparel & leather 2.7
Wood products & printing 0.0
Non-metallic mineral products 1.3
Rubber & Plastic Products 0.5
Iron & Steel 5.6
Non-ferrous metals 0.8
Shipbuilding & Repairing 0.0
Non-electrical machinery 3.4
Electrical machinery (excl. comm. Equipment) 8.3
Motor vehicles 4.4
Other transport equipment 5.1
Other manufacturing 1.5
TOTAL 33.7
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Table 3.4: MNC Sectoral Share of Sales
SECTOR MNC Total Asset share MNC GFA share MNC Sales share
Food, Beverages, Tobacco 13.9 21.4 29.7
Leather Products 30.3 38.5 52.1
Textiles 2.2 7.2 5
Wood Products 0 0 0
Pulp & Paper Products 20.5 10.7 9.9
Chemicals 29.4 11.2 24.1
Plastics & Rubber 4.1 9.7 10.2
Mineral Products 40.3 35.2 47.2
Non-metallic mineral products 3.1 4.7 5.7
Base metals 2.3 7.6 5.5
Non-electrical machinery 23.3 25.2 24.5
Electrical machinery 24.1 19.4 23.5
Electronics 8.6 15.3 18.1
Transport Equipment 12.4 24.3 23.9
Diversified 3.2 5.8 16.4
Electricity 1.7 4.9 2.5
Source: PROWESS
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics -  MNCs and Local Firms
MNC LOCAL
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Total Assets 148.4 347.7 89.9 419.7
Net Sales 173.5 453.3 67.0 236.6
Gross Fixed Assets 95.7 256.4 57.9 307.3
Total Exports 17.6 59.9 6.9 28.6
Total Imports 24.8 94.1 8.9 56.4
Exports/Sales 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.27
Imports/Sales 0.15 0.31 0.14 0.71
Cost of Production/Sales 0.76 0.25 0.86 0.51
Wages 13.29 24.60 4.97 21.46
Wages/Costs of Production 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.16
Advertising/Sales 0.010 0.021 0.005 0.019
R&D/Sales 0.001 0.010 0.023 1.600
Marketing&Distribution/Sales 0.050 0.271 0.035 0.197
Imported inputs/Sales 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.70
No. of Observations 1560 22668
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F igure 3.1a: E xport In tensity  - Local v s  MNC
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Figure 3.3: MNC Presence & Export Intensity in Industry
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Figure 3.5a: R eturns on A sse ts  (wtd): MNCs v s  Locals
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of Change in Profitability: Locals vs MNCs -  1990-1996
T o ta l MNC L o c a l
T o ta l C h a n g e  in P rofitab ility -0 .02615 -0.024 -0.02563
out of which:
C o n trib u tio n  o f E n te rin g  F irm s -0.00884 -0.014 -0.00432
C o n trib u tio n  o f E xiting F irm s -0 .00223 0.00001 -0.00179
R e a llo c a tio n  a m o n g s t  S u rv iv in g  F irm s 0 .007108 -0.0397 0.01372
P rofitab ility  c h a n g e s  fo r  S u rv iv o rs -0 .02309 0.0301 -0.03075
Decomposition based on Bailev, Hulten, and Campbell (1992)
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Table 3.7: Transition Matrices: Levels Persistence 1990-97
MNC P rofits (t+1)
< -0.3 r-o.3 to -0.21 r-o.2 to -0.11 r-o.1 to oi ro to o.n ro.1 to 0.21 ro.2 to 0.31 ro.3 to 0.51 > 0.5 Total
<-0.3 49.3 15.5 12.7 7.0 5.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 1.4 100
[-0.3 to -0.2 12.9 28.6 32.9 10.0 7.1 7.1 0.0 0.0 1.4 100
[-0.2 to-0.1 6.0 12.7 38.1 28.4 9.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 100
[-0.1 to 0] 1.6 3.5 11.9 50.5 25.4 4.1 1.3 0.9 0.9 100
[0 to 0.1] 1.2 0.6 2.9 21.6 51.5 15.5 3.8 2.1 0.9 100
[0.1 to 0.2] 3.4 1.4 2.1 13.7 28.8 30.1 11.0 6.9 2.7 100
[0.2 to 0.3] 1.4 0.0 1.4 2.7 11.0 19.2 28.8 28.8 6.9 100
[0.3 to 0.5] 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 2.5 6.7 14.2 50.0 24.2 100
>0.5 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.2 3.0 0.8 4.5 17.2 71.6 100
Total 4.8 4.5 9.7 22.1 23.8 10.2 5.8 8.9 10.2 100
SHORROCKs INDEX 0.627
L ocal P ro fits  (t+1)
<-0.3 [-0.3 to -0.2] [-0.2 to -0.1] [-0.1 to 0] [0 to 0.1] [0.1 to 0.21 [0.2 to 0.3] [0.3 to 0.5] >0.5 Total
<-0.3 56.4 15.4 11.0 7.9 3.8 1.7 1.2 0.6 2.1 100
[-0.3 to-0.2 18.7 29.8 31.8 11.3 3.7 1.6 1.4 0.7 1.0 100
[-0.2 to-0.1 7.1 11.1 37.1 32.5 8.5 2.1 0.6 0.6 0.5 100
[-0.1 to 0] 2.9 2.7 13.4 532 22.5 3.7 0.8 0.5 0.4 100
[0 to 0.1] 1.1 1.3 4.0 26.4 502 12.7 2.7 1.2 0.4 100
[0.1 to 0.2] 1.4 0.7 2.1 11.4 34.8 31.0 10.5 6.4 1.7 100
[0.2 to 0.3] 1.7 0.4 2.9 7.0 18.6 26.5 22.4 16.1 4.5 100
[0.3 to 0.5] 0.9 1.0 1.6 5.7 13.1 17.9 18.8 28.4 12.7 100
>0.5 3.3 1.0 1.6 3.1 7.8 5.7 7.8 17.4 52.4 100
Total 6.5 5.1 12.5 29.7 25.8 9.9 4.1 3.6 3.0 100
SHORROCK’s INDEX 0.674
133
Figure 3.6a: Profitability Transitions - Local Firms
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Figure 3.6b: Profitability Transitions: MNCs
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Figure 3.6c: Shorrock's Mobility Index - Local & MNCs 1990-97
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Table 3.8a (panel 1): MNCs -  Persistence in Deciles
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 50 18.6 6.4 8.6 2.9 4 .3 5.0 0.7 2.9 0.7 100
2 18.9 28.8 28.0 7.6 9.9 4 .6 1.5 0 0 0.76 100
3 5.0 20.1 33.1 20.1 12.2 2 .2 4.3 1.4 0.0 1.4 100
4 7.6 9.0 17.4 31.9 15.3 10.4 4.2 3.5 0.7 0.0 100
5 3.6 2.9 6 .5 20.9 33.1 20.1 8.6 2.9 0.7 0.7 100
6 2.7 2.7 4.1 8.1 17.6 33.1 21.0 8.8 1.4 0.7 100
7 2.8 0.7 2 .8 2.8 9.7 22.2 25.7 24.3 4.9 4.2 100
8 2.1 1.4 1.4 3.5 2.8 4 .9 23 .9 38.0 19.7 2.1 100
9 0.7 1.4 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 16.0 56.3 17.4 100
10 0.7 0.7 0 .0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.7 5.8 15.3 75.2 100
Total 9.3 8.5 10.0 10.4 10.5 10.4 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.2 100
Table 3.8a (panel 2): Locals -  Persistence in Deciles
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 52.4 17.7 8 .6 5.0 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.5 3.0 100
2 14.7 31.5 25.2 10.6 6.4 3.8 3.2 2.0 1.7 1.0 100
3 9.8 13.9 24.1 25.1 11.0 6.6 3.9 3.4 1.6 0.7 100
4 6.4 7.9 14.0 24.5 20.2 12.5 6.2 4.9 2.6 1.0 100
5 5.5 5.5 9.1 15.6 22.0 21.0 12.8 5.3 2.3 1.0 100
6 2.7 3.2 5.4 10.4 18.8 22.2 19.6 10.9 5.3 1.5 100
7 3.2 2.3 4 .0 6.0 12.4 17.7 24.4 19.2 8.4 2.5 100
8 2.3 1.8 1.9 4.2 7.7 11.4 17.4 27.6 20.2 5.6 100
9 1.7 1.1 1.4 2.3 3.4 5.8 10.5 18.7 37.8 17.4 100
10 2.2 0.6 0 .7 1.3 2.0 2.2 3.4 7.2 17.7 62.7 100
Total 9.8 8.5 9 .3 10.4 10.7 10.6 10.5 10.3 10.2 9.8 100
Figure 3.7b: P e rs is ten ce bv Deciles: LocalsF igure  3 .7a: P e rs is te n c e  by D ecile: MNCs
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Table 3.8b (panel 1): Local Firms -  Persistence in Deciles -  No. of Firms
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total
1 868 293 142 82 53 44 44 39 42 50 1657
2 265 569 455 191 116 68 57 36 30 18 1805
3 163 231 400 417 182 110 64 56 27 12 1662
4 112 137 244 427 352 218 108 85 46 17 1746
5 97 98 162 278 391 374 228 94 41 18 1781
6 49 57 96 185 336 396 350 195 95 27 1786
7 56 41 70 107 219 313 432 340 149 45 1772
8 41 32 35 75 139 206 315 500 365 101 1809
9 30 20 25 41 61 105 190 338 684 315 1809
10 40 11 12 23 36 40 61 130 317 1126 1796
Total 1721 1489 1641 1826 1885 1874 1849 1813 1796 1729 17623
Table 3.8b (panel 2): MNCs -  Persistence in Deciles -  No. of Firms
Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 70 26 9 12 4 6 7 1 4 1
2 25 38 37 10 13 6 2 0 0 1
3 7 28 46 28 17 3 6 2 0 2
4 11 13 25 46 22 15 6 5 1 0
5 5 4 9 29 46 28 12 4 1 1
6 4 4 6 12 26 49 31 13 2 1
7 4 1 4 4 14 32 37 35 7 6
8 3 2 2 5 4 7 34 54 28 3
9 1 2 3 0 0 0 9 23 81 25
10 1 1 0 0 2 0 1 8 21 103
Total 131 119 141 146 148 146 145 145 145 143
Total
140
132
139
144
139
148
144
142
144
137
1409
137
Pr
of
its
Table 3.8c : Persistence in Deciles -  Summary Statistics
Decile
Maximum
Return
Median
R eturn
Median
C hanqe
Inter-Q uartile
R anqe
N um ber o 
Firm s
M N C s
1 -0.09 -0.27 -0.09 0.30 131
2 -0.03 -0.08 -0.01 0.10 119
3 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.06 141
4 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.09 146
5 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.08 148
6 0.17 0.09 0.02 0.08 146
7 0.29 0.17 0.03 0.16 145
8 0.46 0.30 0.06 0.21 145
9 0.81 0.49 0.03 0.19 145
10 12.95 0.99 0.14 0.52 143
LO CA LS
1 -0.131 -0 .292 -0.120 0 .266 1,721
2 -0 .076 -0 .109 -0.022 0 .104 1,489
3 -0 .034 -0.071 -0.003 0 .067 1,641
4 -0 .022 -0 .042 0.003 0.071 1,826
5 -0 .002 -0 .016 -0.002 0 .072 1,885
6 0.031 0.012 0.006 0 .076 1,874
7 0 .074 0 .045 0.012 0 .090 1,849
8 0.141 0 .093 0.016 0.111 1,813
9 0 .313 0 .180 0.028 0 .153 1,796
10 15.148 0 .449 0.080 0 .313 1,729
Figure 3.7c: Profitability by Deciles: MNCs and Local Firms -1989-97
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Table 4.1: Industry Groups & MNC Presence
Avg. No. o f 
M NCs
MNC m kt s h -  
1989-91
MNC m kt s h  - 
1992-97
T re a tm e n t
Automobile ancillaries 4 18.7% 17.6%
Castings & forgings 2.24 7.7% 5.4%
Electronic components 2.48 12.9% 6.2%
Electronic equipments 3.3 15.6% 13.5%
Electronic tubes 0 - -
Ferro alloys 0.84 4.4% 14.0%
Glass & glassware 1.86 14.7% 9.7%
Industrial machinery(excl.chem&text.) 5.8 38.1% 31.6%
Inorganic chemicals 1 6.2% 5.4%
Machine tools 3.95 39.1% 35.7%
Motors & generators 2 19.4% 25.7%
Nitrogenous fertilisers 0 - -
Pig iron 0.85 - 17.5%
Plastic resins 0.28 - 51.2%
Plastic sheets 1 43.8% 28.7%
Plastic tubes & pipes 0 - -
Prime movers 1.52 57.8% 46.2%
Soyabean products 0 - -
Sponge iron 1 80.8% 79.0%
Tyres & tubes 2.9 19.0% 16.7%
C on tro l
Bakery & milling products 0 - -
Beer 3.1 27.1% 15.6%
Clocks & watches 0 - -
Jute products 0 - -
Minerals 1.9 46.7% 39.7%
Oil cakes & animal feed 0.61 - 1.4%
Paper 1.91 10.0% 8.3%
Poultry & meat products 0 - -
Silk textiles 0 - -
Sugar 0 - -
Textile machinery 2.8 14.7% 7.9%
Vanaspati 0 - -
Wood 0 - -
T re a tm e n t2
Computer hardware 3.2 24.0% 11.6%
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Computer software 6.2 19.3% 14.5%
Cosmetics & toiletries 5.55 63.3% 61.7%
Electronic equipments 3.32 15.6% 13.5%
Footwear 1.57 76.7% 57.2%
Lubricants, etc. 3.14 65.1% 75.3%
Misc. electrical machinery 1.54 21.3% 31.7%
Plastic packaging goods 0.63 0.0% 0.2%
Plastic resins 0.28 0.0% 51.2%
Pumps & compressors 5.53 45.1% 43.7%
Readymade garments 0.73 0.0% 0.7%
Refractories 0.68 0.0% 6.5%
Woollen textiles 1.62 3.5% 24.6%
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Table 4.2: Comparing Average Profits
In d u s try  G ro u p  P e r io d  A v erag e  P ro fit M arg in s
Treatment Before Reforms (1989-91) 4.31%
After Reforms (1992-97) -9.77%
Control Before Reforms 3.69%
After Reforms -3.83%
O b s e rv a tio n s
760
3006
440
1685
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Table 4.3: Determinants of Firm Profitability
Arel-Bond (FD-IV) OLS FE
rn f21 T31 F41
Lagged Profits 0.174** 0.171** 0.194** -0.101**
0.037 0.037 0.016 0.021
Reformsl -0.038**
0.015
Reforms2 -0.106** -0.035** -0.078**
0.033 0.012 0.021
Market Share 6.1** 6.01** 1.13** 4.678**
1.93 1.895 0.483 1.219
Concentration 0.807** 0.776** -0.149** 0.332
0.326 0.325 0.053 0.222
Import Intensity 0.326 -0.316* -0.115
0.387 0.127 0.284
Mkt Sh*Conc -5.127** -5.081 -1.066 -4.21**
2.053 Z047 0.590 1.307
Mkt Sh*Profit Lag -8.88** -8.785 -0.450 1.767
1.488 1.485 0.792 1.018
Mkt Sh*lmports -0.345 0.851
1.966 1.269
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 4625 3577 4726 4726
Wald chi2 80.26 (14) 86.19(12)
R-squared 0.06 0.03
F-Statistic 21.52 8.43
Dep. Var. is Profits/Sales; ** Significant at 1% evel; * Significant at 5% level; Std errors be
Reforms 1 is dummy which is 1 if firm in treatment group of industries and post-reform years 
Reforms2 is dummy which is 1 if firm in treatment group & post-reform years & MNC entry in industry 
Mkt Sh: Market Share; Cone: Industry Concentration; Imports: Industry Import Intensity
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Table 4.4: Reforms and Multinationality
Local Firms MNC
Arel.-Bond (FD-IV) Arel-Bond (FD-IV)
rn I21 I31 141
Lagged Profits 0.173** 0.17** 0.68** 0.67**
0.039 0.038 0.208 0.206
Reforms 1 -0.04** -0.015
0.015 0.034
Reforms2 -0.122** 0.017
0.036 0.109
Market Share 6.06** 5.99** 9.1* 9.08*
2.02 2.02 3.76 3.75
Concentration 0.84* 0.816* 1.45* 1.44*
0.343 0.342 0.595 0.59
Mkt Sh*Conc -5.16* -5.12* -7.53* -7.53*
2.180 2.180 3.77 3.76
Mkt Sh*Profit Lag -8.86** -8.77** -24.03** -23.8**
1.548 1.546 6.64 6.59
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Size 3359 3359 1405 1405
Wald chi2 74.85(12) 82.16 (12) 24.79(12) 24.87(12)
Dep. Var. is Profits/Sales; ** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5% level; Std errors below co-effs 
Sample for regressions [1] and [2] are pre-1991 local firms 
Sample for regressions [3] and [4] are pre-1991 MNCs
Reforms 1 is dummy which is 1 if firm in treatment group of industries and post-reform years 
Reforms2 is dummy which is 1 if firm in treatment group & post-reform years & MNC entry in industry 
Mkt Sh: Market Share; Cone: Industry Concentration; Imports: Industry Import Intensity
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Table 4.5: List of MNCs Entering Reform Industries
Industry Company Entry Year
(Treatment 2 Group)
Computer hardware Hinditron Informatics Ltd. 1991
Redinoton (India) Ltd. 1993
Computer software BFL Software Ltd. 1992
Polaris Software Lab Ltd. 1993
Silveriine Industries Ltd. 1992
Cosmetics & toiletries Lever India Exports Ltd. 1993
Electronic eauipments M 1L Controls Ltd. 1994
Footwear Stiefel Und Schuh India Ltd. 1994
Lubricants, etc. E L F  Lubricants (India) Ltd. 1993
Gulf Oil India Ltd. [Erstwhile] 1993
Misc. electrical machinery S A B  Wabco India Ltd. 1991
Plastic packaaina aoods Ras Propack Lamipack Ltd. 1993
Plastic resins Ciba Speciality Chemicals (India) Ltd. 1997
Pumps & compressors Beacon Process Pumps Ltd. 1991
Readvmade aarments G! VO Ltd. 1993
Refractories Vesuvius India Ltd. 1991
Woollen textiles Fabworth (India) Ltd. 1992
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Table 5.1: Decomposition of Growth in Aggregate Export Intensity: 1990-96
T o ta l C h a n g e  in E x p o rt In te n s ity  (X' - X) 0.0490
out of which:
C o n trib u tio n  o f E n te r in g  F irm s 0.0098
C o n trib u tio n  o f  E xiting  F irm s 0 .00014
R e a llo c a tio n  a m o n g s t  S u rv iv in g  F irm s 0.0074
E x p o rt In te n s ity  G a in s  fo r  S u rv iv o rs 0.0309
Decomposition based on Bailey, Hulten, and Campbell (1992)
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Figure 5.1: Export Intensity - All Manufacturing 1989-1997
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Table 5.2: Sample Characteristics
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total # of firms 1253 1621 1854 2241 2903 3657 4004 3801 3054
# of Firms ExDortina 689 868 955 1210 1554 1784 1885 2091 2138
# of Firms Not ExDortina 564 753 899 1031 1270 1349 1710 1772 1866
% of Firms Exporting 51.5 51.5 53.4 53.5 53.5 54.0 55.0 55.0 58.4
% of MNCs Exporting 62.3 63.1 67.9 68.8 70.9 72.8 74.6 75.3 76.1
Continuing Exporters from 1989 689 639 620 592 579 563 561 534 497
% of Continuing Exporter: 92.7 90.0 85.9 84.0 81.7 81.4 77.5 72.1
Table 53: Characteristics of Exporters & Non-Exporters
1990 1996
Exporters Non-Exp. Exporters Non-Exp
Sales 93.3 25.25 138.3 29.0
Profits/Assets 0.178 0.117 0.08 -0.006
Profits/Sales 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.24
% of which are MNCs 12.2 8.2 7.9 3.2
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Table 5.4: Firm Characteristics and the Decision to Export
O LS O LS O LS
ExDorted Last Year 0.757** 0.755** 0.737**
0.005 0.005 0.005
Last ExDorted 2 vears aao 0.18** 0.177** 0.17**
0.01 0.01 0.02
Sales 6.57*1 O'6** 5*1 O'5** 7*1 O'5**
9.76*10‘5 9*10 6 n o ' 5
Profitability 0.008* 0.026** 0.02**
0.004 0.006 0.005
MNC 0.07** 0.058** 0.06**
0.008 0.009 0.009
MNC mkt share in industry -0.03
0.019
New MNCs in Industry -0.005 0.003
0.006 0.008
Export Intensity in Industry 0.14** 0.09
0.02 0.08
MNC Export-Share in Industry -0.025* 0.03
0.013 0.02
No. of Exporters in Industry 0.0003*
0.0001
No. of MNC Exporters -0.0003
0.0008
Bom after 1990 0.014 0.018* 0.01*
0.009 0.008 0.008
Reforms Dummy 0.069**
0.01
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies No No Yes
Binary Dependent Variable - Y = probability of firm exporting 
** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5% level.
Standard Errors below Co-efficients
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Table 5.5: Firm Characteristics and Export Intensity
OLS O LS O L S
(1)_________________(2)_______________ (3)
ExDort Intensity Last Year 0.456** 0.755** 0.5**
0.005 0.008 0.004
ExDort Intensity 2 years aao 0.14**
0.008
Sales .01** 0.025 .01**
0.005 0.030 0.005
Profitability 0.025** 0.01** 0.02**
0.002 0.002 0.005
MNC -0.0007 -.0003
0.004 0.003
MNC mkt share in industry -0.03 0.007
0.019 0.02
Export Intensity in Industry 0.24** -0.04
0.04 0.03
MNC ExDort-Share in Industry 0.009 -0.005 0.03
0.01 0.009 0.02
No. of Exporters in Industry 0.006**
0.001
Bom after 1990 0.014** 0.004
0.004 0.004
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable = export intensity of firm (exports/sales) 
** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5% level. 
Standard Errors below Co-efficients
149
Table 5.6: Fixed Effects and First Difference-IV Model of Export Participation
FE FE A-B
(1)_______________ (2)_______________(31
Exported Last Year 0.23** 0.22** 0.359**
0.01 0.01 0.005
Last Exported 2 years ago -0.004 -0.01
0.02 0.01
Sales -0.009 -0.01 -0.002
0.018 0.02 -0.029
Profitability -0.0008 0.008 -0.0017
0.005 0.009 0.006
MNC mkt share in industry 0.084 0.02
0.06 0.03
New MNCs in Industry 0.005
0.01
Export Intensity in Industry 0.2** 0.02
0.08 0.05
MNC Exoort-Share in Industry 0.004 -0.007
0.03 0.016
No. of Exporters in Industry 0.0005
0.0003
No. of MNC Exporters -0.008
0.005
Born after 1990 0.037**
0.01
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Binary Dependent Variable - Y = probability of firm exporting 
** Significant at 1% level; * Significant at 5% level.
Standard Errors below Co-efficients
FE: Fixed Effects Model; A-B: Arellano Bond Model
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T ab le  5.7: C o m p arin g  R andom  E ffec ts-P ro b it a n d  F irs t D iffe rences E stim ation
Probit A-B
Exported Last Year 2.4** 0.359**
0.03 0.005
Last Exported 2 vears aao 0.607**
0.07
Sales 0 .002** -0.002
0.0002 -0.03
Profitability 0 .12** -0.0017
0.03 0.006
MNC 0.37**
0.05
MNC mkt share in industry 0.05
0.11
New MNCs in Industry 0.005
0.01
